BOOK REVIEWS


These two books are written by specialists. However, these works are of interest to historically-oriented comparativists and to students of international relations. Comparativists bring order to the diversity of political systems by creating a taxonomy of systems of authority. Students of international relations are interested in the developmental potential of different types of political systems. Systems of political/military dominance differ in their capacity to facilitate development of society, which affects their capability to expand or, respectively, to defend themselves against expansion.

Matthee and Pamuk report on two different members of the species of political systems that have been coined by, among others, Kautsky as “Aristocratic Empires” (John Kautsky, The Politics of Aristocratic Empires, 1982). This type of political system has now become extinct. The legacy of imperial systems, however, extends into the present. Both authors present materials gained from original archival research on these systems. Monetary policy in the Ottoman Empire and the politics of silk in Safavid Iran contribute to a better understanding of the strength and weaknesses of these empires.

In this report, I will first introduce Pamuk’s research on Ottoman monetary policy, to be followed by the policy of silk trade in Safavid Iran. Pamuk comes up with two findings on Ottoman price series that are of interest to students of international relations. First, prices for a dozen basic food items from 1469 to 1914, experience two waves of inflation. The first one is rather weak and runs from the late sixteenth to the middle of the seventeenth century. A much stronger upward move in prices begins in late-eighteenth century and ends in mid-nineteenth century. This part of Pamuk’s research will also be of interest to scholars of long waves in politics and economics (for an exhaustive study, see Joshua S. Goldstein, Long Cycles. Prosperity and Wear in the Modern Age. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988). The first Ottoman price wave coincides in time with the price revolution in the western era of mercantile capitalism. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire straddled the European and Asian parts of the transcontinental trade network that connected the Far East, the Near East, the Mediterranean, and Western Europe. Flows of goods and specie linked these parts of the world. Pamuk refers to earlier research by Barkan. He suggests that Ottoman difficulties are “the product of contact” of the rather closed imperial economy “with the Atlantic economy.” Pamuk finds little evidence supporting Barkan’s hypothesis that the earlier price wave resulted from silver-inflation imported into the Empire through trade with the Mediterranean and Europe. Pamuk provides evidence for currency debasement by the Sultan being the dominant cause. Silver-inflation through international trade clearly is a secondary cause of the first wave of price increases. However, Pamuk correctly argues
that debasement and silver-inflation do not exhaust the domain of possible explanations. Increasing the velocity of a fixed stock of money circulating in society also brings about price-inflation, assuming \textit{ceteris paribus}. Pamuk supports the finding of other scholars that increasing velocity of circulation was not an Ottoman internal phenomenon. The Ottoman Empire did participate in the commercial, urban, and demographic changes of the early modern period in European history. Barkan may be correct in asserting that imperial institutions, particularly in taxation and financing the armed forces, were badly shaped to cope with these changes, thus initiating the downward slide of the Empire.

The longer wave follows from the even more drastic debasement of the silver content of the Akçe. The second wave covers the period of Ottoman decline. Pamuk finds that throughout the history of the Ottoman Empire, subjects of the Sultan involved in trade and finance were too weak to capture central state power, to transform it and use state capacity for the expansion of wealth through trade and technological progress. The capacity of a state to unleash and to implement a project of national development is the most crucial determinant of survival of societies in which no bourgeois hegemony exists. So-called “economic difficulties” are seldom “economic” in nature.

Matthee studies the politics and economics of the Safavid dynasty (1502-1736) of Iran. This dynasty unified the territories in which peoples of Iranian descent lived. The dynasty’s successful enterprise of empire building created the conditions for the emergence of a more homogenized “Iranian people” and of modern Iranian nationalism. During the reign of the Safavids, Iranian society evolved from a tribal system of power into an agrarian-aristocratic empire ruled by a dynasty. The silk trade of Safavid rulers between 1600 and 1730 is used as a point of entry into that transition. Matthee’s book is therefore a study of political development. The level of political development of a society constrains the potential of its people to create wealth. State capacity and societal wealth are connected through taxation. The comparative level of political and economic development of a society determines its fitness to cope with outsiders.

Tribal power may be classified as patrimonial or chieftain-like. Chieftains organize a realm of personal domination conceived as a household. The power of chiefs to take decisions is great, though constrained by tradition. Chieftains, however, miss an apparatus for implementing policy. Imperial rulers also have great personal power. These rulers, however, also command a bureaucracy for implementing policy. The tribal heritage of the new imperial regime is reflected in the enduring appeal of cavalry as its preferred weapon over modern artillery.

The silk trade policy of the emerging Safavid rulers links the “internal” world of the emerging empire and its “external” arena. However, institutions inherited from the past intervene between internal responses and outside opportunities or threats. The internal-external distinction is itself the result of the creation of a system of territorial rule. Safavid Iran succeeded in conquering from the Uzbeks the northern province of Chorassan but failed to hold Iraq. How are the trading world and imperial institutions related to each other in terms of control over sources of power in politics and in economics? Is control of political power the preferred means of getting access to wealth? Sharing in political power may be the best avenue to get a larger slice of society’s wealth. In such a regulation, “politics of the belly,” to quote Bayart, evolves into a neo-patrimonial setting.
Under imperial systems of rule, the politics of prestige, of religious legitimization, and of conquest will divert funds away from productivity-increasing investments, and in this way constrain economic development. Or, alternatively, do possessors of wealth, in the process of building wealth also get access to political power? In this case, political authority of merchants will protect an economic-political status group. A group of oligarchs will divert internal sources of revenue towards external investment projects and suppress commercial activity of potential competitors at home. Or do public institutions emerge, leading to a political capacity for making and implementing a policy of development for the realm as a whole? If this is the case, political authority is geared to promoting security and wealth for a political community.

Using VOC archives and Indian Office Records in Great Britain, among others, Matthee’s book finds that Safavid rulers in the period he studied had international trade high on the agenda. The destruction of the Portuguese colony in Ormuz under Shah Abbas I (1588-1629) opened silk outlets in the Gulf. Iran sat astride the trade routes extending from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean ports of the Ottoman Empire, with a separate artery via Russia to Western Europe. However, Matthee finds that Safavid rulers created a system of authority that highly constrained the ability of its rulers to generate power from wealth and to use power to increase productivity. Surplus extraction limited, instead of expanded, production and investment. The expanding western world would ultimately penetrate Iran. Commercialization of the silk trade failed to set Iran on the path of long-term development. Hoarding wealth is preferred in unstable times over investing it.

Unlike nation states, empires are held together by compulsory gift giving and by status deference between central authority and local agents of state power. Hidden reciprocity in these relations reflects the limited ability of political superiors to enforce their will on inferiors. The result is paralysis of development, leading to social stasis. In societies like these, impressive monuments will be built. At the court, many things may happen, but there is no development of productive forces. Authorities in such a system are unable to transform wealth into a form of state power that does not destroy the source of wealth. Shah Abbas I, named The Great, built Isfahan as his residence. Up until today, it has remained Iran’s historical treasure capital. He combined despotic power at home with a capacity to mobilize resources for conquering Iran’s silk-producing territories and incorporating these into his realm as sources of revenue. However, he also limited his take compared with what he could have received by regularly taxing producers of wealth at a predictable low rate in a booming economy. A booming economy requires monetary stability to promote investment in the realm. Abbas’ rush to collect personal treasure by eliminating his domestic rivals, the traditional warrior class, and by defeating the Ottomans and Uzbeks, among others, set him on a sub-optimal path of development for Iran as a whole. Reproducing dynastic political power became the priority, at the cost of domestic producers, over promoting investment and the expansion of taxable wealth. In Iran, therefore, producers and traders were too weak to build political institutions that promoted the expansion of wealth. External traders invested elsewhere profits made in the silk trade. British and Dutch carriers of silk could not compete militarily with the Shah. They thus failed in getting direct control of rural production sites or in contacting private traders. In Iran, as in China and Japan, these
merchants met the intervening court. The court being the militarily stronger party, British and Dutch traders could not impose forced labor and monopolize trade. As the weaker party, they could not exterminate rebellious local labor and bring in new people to work on “company land,” as the Dutch did in the distributed realms on Ternate and Tidore. The British under Cromwell implemented such a trade policy in Ireland. In Safavid Iran, foreigners had the choice of complying with the wishes of the ruler or to stay away and find alternative sources of supply that could be more amenable to their profit-maximizing effort. That should have opened the window for long-term development of state and society in Iran. The proceeds of the silk trade could have been invested into the Iranian economy. That did not occur. Armenians, due to their court connections and access to multiple outlets in the Volga and Levant, dominated the silk trade, despite control over sea-lanes by the Dutch and British chartered companies. In the Appendix to his study, Matthee gives an annual time series for VOC and EIC silk exports from Iran between 1618 and 1715. That series wildly fluctuates, reflecting instability in the processes underlying that series.

To conclude, both books under review here, by shifting the focus away from European maritime expansion towards the worlds between India, Central Asia, and the Mediterranean, will no doubt help to reinforce the comparative approach to the study of regional processes of development in the pre-industrial era of international relations. After Western Europe had moved to industrial capitalism, this part of the world would be under threat, as well as under the compulsion to catch-up. Societies in this part of the world are still involved in that struggle. Outcome knowledge brings the risk of bias by antedating the beginning of European hegemony. Works published in the series, Cambridge Studies in Islamic Civilization are extremely useful as a much-wanted corrective.

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The subject of foreign aid continues to draw scholarly attention in part because of its impotence as a source of development finance for developing countries. The other reason stems from the enduring controversy in the field of international political economy about whether foreign aid is more appropriately construed as a humanitarian gesture, or a tool of foreign policy which donor countries employ to promote their parochial national interests. Rubin Patterson subscribes to the latter position. In his book: Foreign Aid After the Cold War: The Dynamics of Multipolar Economic Competition, he sought to answer “key questions surrounding the issue of foreign aid: (1) Just what interests are dominant states pursuing in poor countries in general, and in any country in particular? (2) Do states pursue “national interests” in subordinate countries through foreign aid?” His central thesis is that the volume of trade between aid donors and the recipient states, together with
the extent of the involvement of (TNCs) trans-national corporations (originating from the donor countries) in the recipient states are the primary determinants of what state gets favorite treatment as an aid recipient. Asserting that the term “foreign aid” is a misnomer because, it imbues the foreign aid policies of rich countries with altruistic motivations, Patterson suggests the term “foreign state investment” (FSI) as a more appropriate one for conceptualizing the transfer of concessional resources from rich countries to poor ones. He argues that “foreign aid has always been an instrument of foreign policy used advantageously by powerful states in their relations with more fragile states” (p.21).

Patterson’s effort to substantiate his thesis is persuasive on one score, and problematic on another.

His analysis of the peripheral position of many developing countries in the emerging structure of the post-Cold War international system is insightful and thought provoking. In particular, his detailed descriptions of the changing locus of international commerce (Chapter 2), and what the technological underpinnings of the post-Cold War global economy bodes for many developing countries (Chapter 5) are interesting and persuasive. According to him, the scientific advances recorded by developed countries in the fields of bio-technology, materials engineering, and micro-electronics, threaten not only to widen the gap in standards of living between rich and poor countries, but also further to marginalize poor countries as developed countries turn to substitutes for goods which were once imported from developing countries: “Biotechnology will cause many subordinate nations to lose foreign earnings by making their agricultural crops irrelevant to the D-5. The adverse impact is palpable” (p.144).

Patterson’s effort to substantiate his central thesis that the driving forces behind foreign state investment (FSI) is trade and the interests of TNCs is, however, problematic on methodological and empirical grounds. First, the methodology which he employed to “compare and categorize FSI distributions and trade” (p.58) is not sufficiently clear. Given the quantitative basis of his study one would have expected him to employ one of the many more rigorous statistical methods of data analysis popular in the field. Instead, he appears to rely on a simple comparison of sample means for his analysis. The effect of this method is that spurious and impressionistic correlation attains unwarranted significance in his study. For example, in his discussion of the relationship between strategic minerals and aid allocation, he asserts that “with the exception of Zaire, Japan indisputably shows a very strong correlation between its supply of FSI and a subordinate nation’s supply of a strategic mineral to Japan” (p.91). This observation might be true in relation to the recipient of Japan’s aid in Asia. With respect to the pattern of its post-Cold War aid allocations to a region such as sub-Saharan Africa, however, a review of several OECD document: Development Cooperation reveals that its favorite countries are Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, and Ghana. These are not the richest countries in the sub-continent in terms of their possession of strategic minerals. Japan’s foreign aid behavior therefore warrants a more nuanced interpretation than Patterson’s conclusions suggest.

In addition to the above point, Patterson’s attempt to locate his study within a theoretical framework is commendable, but the way he lumps realism together with critical theory and historical materialism is problematic, given the distinct assumptions of these perspectives. For example, while historical materialism presupposes that the nexus of
interstate relations is primarily economic, realism privileges the power-political aspects of such relationships. To lump the two perspectives into one framework confuses rather than clarifies the salient assumptions of both theories on the subject of foreign aid.

All in all, despite the density of his prose and his many controversial assertions, Patterson’s book is a useful addition to the existing literature on foreign aid, especially because of the attention it calls to potential impact of new technologies on the fate of foreign aid. It should make for an interesting reading for scholars and policy makers alike.

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Criminal Profiling provides a broad overview of the field of psychological profiling (currently referred to as investigative profiling) and uses examples that are contemporary and relevant to each chapter. Each of the twenty-five chapters and seven appendices are written in a clear and generally concise manner; however, there are some unnecessary redundancies throughout the book as arguments are continually posed in favor of deductive profiling. The chapters provide a logical progression from a discussion of inductive and deductive profiling to crime scene reconstruction and to victimology. In addition to being very critical of alternative methods of profiling (alternatives to the author’s preferred methodology, that is) the author devotes two chapters and two appendices to criticism of what appears to be every type of profiling except that advocated by the author himself. Contributing authors provide some very interesting sections of the book. This is particularly the case for the chapter on cyber crime and an appendix on task force management. A helpful glossary is provided at the end of the book and references are listed at the end of each chapter. A list of references at the end of the book would have been more helpful to this reviewer.

A major theme to the book would appear to be the author’s argument that the “most effective criminal profilers tend to be those who have first been trained as competent forensic investigators, with an appreciation for the value of forensic evidence, and the ability to perform at least some level of wound pattern analysis” (p.229). Why the author refers only to wound pattern analysis is a mystery to this reviewer, since this is only one type of forensic evidence.

When profiling other than deductive profiling is discussed, the author’s comments become argumentative and very critical. He seems to be critical of almost anyone conducting criminal profiling such as the FBI, police trained by the FBI, forensic psychologists and psychiatrists, criminologists, and detectives and investigators. The author’s criticism of geographic profiling and investigative profiling as alternative methods of profiling is presented in such a manner that this reviewer doubts whether the author understands these techniques or is being disingenuous in his comments (see, for example, pp.262-265).
The author claims, “The motivation for offender homicidal behavior and offender rape or sexual assault are the same” (p.286). Many criminologists would disagree with such a blatant assertion, which has no empirical foundation.

The author is not being completely forthright in his comments on the alleged bite mark evidence on the head of one of the victims in a triple homicide in West Memphis, Arkansas (see color plates). While the author correctly notes that a Board certified odontologist identified these wounds as a bite mark, he fails to tell the reader that other odontologists found that the wound was not a bite mark.

It should also be noted that the author’s experience is somewhat circumspect. He refers to the fact that he “has worked on several capital cases” (p.229). However, these cases are never identified for the reader nor is the term “several” qualified.

Notwithstanding this, the author’s work reflects an adequate understanding of the literature of profiling and related topics. Using existing literature the author frequently expands or builds on other people’s work rather than developing his own ideas. Consequently, the work does not really contribute to the literature. The author’s tone is too argumentative and overly critical of other contributions to the field of criminal profiling.

On the whole this book would be of limited value to criminologists, students of criminal justice, and law enforcement officers or anyone interested in criminal profiling.

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