IRANIAN HISTORY: POST-SASANIAN
Spahbed Rustam Farrukh-Hormazd
By: Jehangir Coyajee
The domination of
generals and governors was the last phase of the political evolution of
the
Sasanian period; but this new feudalism had no time to consolidate
itself before the Arab invasion.
In this eminently just
dictum, Professor Christensen draws attention to the most important
factor in the decline and fall of the Sasanian Empire. That feudalism,
according to him, was the result of the military policy inaugurated
under Khosrow I (Anoshirvan the Just); for one result of that policy was
that each
Spahbed or governor considered his province as something like a
hereditary fief.
Professor Christensen
might have gone on to add that, with the decline of the old dynasty,
such generals and governors were tempted more and more to play the part
of king-makers, or to set up as kings themselves. For example, Bahram
Chobin, Vistakhm (Bistam) and Farrukhan Shahrvaraz (Shahran-Guraz) made
themselves kings with temporary success. The fatal example was set by
Bahram Chobin and was followed by Shahran-Guraz with disastrous results
for the unity and independence of old Iran. But the assassination of
Shahran-Guraz convinced the nobles of the country that the game of
usurping the throne was too dangerous, and one which the country,
devoted as it was to the Sasanian dynasty, was not likely to tolerate.
Thenceforward the aristocracy took up the plan of playing the part of
king-makers. This accounts for the very large number of young kings,
who were set up and dethroned after the reign of Shahran-Guraz. Even
before that year under Ardeshir III, Mah-Adhur-Gushnasp had figured as
the regent. Some time later Farrukh-Hormuzd who was the governor of
Khorassan, according to Tabari, or the " ishkan" or prince of
Adurpâtekân (Azarbaijan), according to Armenian sources) aspired to the
crown and attempted to secure it by proposing a marriage to Empress
Azarmidokht. The proud Empress refused these overtures and got rid of
her ambitious suitor by having him assassinated. However, Rustam, the
son of Farrukh-Hormuzd, avenged his father by marching on the capital,
seizing the Empress and having her blinded and deposed. Both father and
son have been styled "ishkans" or "princes” of Azarbaijan by Armenian
writers. It would also appear that prince Rustam had the ambition of
enlarging his realm by conquests. For we read in the Armenian history by
M. St. Martin that Rustam conquered Armenia from its Byzantine governor
Prince Varazdirot in A.D. 631. These Armenian conquests of Rustam might
account for the fact that when he marshaled his army against the Arabs,
there were important Armenian contingents in it.
When we next hear of
Rustam, he has taken the part of Yazdgard III (who had been recently
crowned) who had captured Ctesiphon and installed himself as regent. He
was assisted in his rule by his brother Farrukhzad, who had been made
the "darik-pat" (or chamberlain), and by another leader Zadhoe. It may
be as Noldeke guesses that his support to the coronation of Yazdgard was
simultaneous with his attack on the Empress.
But while there was
little so far to distinguish Rustam from other aristocratic claimants
for power of the day in Iran, he and his brother honorably distinguished
themselves by their single-minded devotion to the sovereign, whom they
had raised to the throne, and to the task of defending Iran against
foreign invaders. They went down fighting for their country and king to
the last, harassed and handicapped though they were by intrigues at the
capital as well as by the indifference of the majority of the Satraps to
the cause of national defense. They have had their reward in the homage
and admiration of Iranians ever since.
In the Iranian Epic,
Rustam is endowed with a noble character and great Vigor; and he and his
brother are held up to admiration as sole champions of Iran and of
Yazdgard. Their unfailing loyalty and energy are contrasted with the
treachery or feebleness of other Iranian spahbeds. Nor have later
historians failed to do justice to Rustam. Christensen describes him "as
a man endowed with extraordinary energy, a good administrator and a fine
general”.
One might also quote
the appreciation of Sir W. Muir: In Rustam “we may discern the
lineaments of a prince brave in the field, but proud and over-weening.
His energy was soon felt. The nobles rallied round him”.
Though Persia was
destined to go down before the invaders from Arabia, fortune favored
Rustam with at least one resounding victory, namely, that at “the battle
of the Bridge”. He successfully recovered the delta from the
Arabs and sent forward against the Arab commander Abu 'Ubaid the one
Persian general in whom his troops had confidence, namely, Bahman
Dhu-l-Hajib, With this latter was joined another general Jalenus, who
had fled before the enemy before and who was now warned that the penalty
of any further retreat would be death. Indeed, though Rustam was not
himself present at the victory of al-Jisr (or the Bridge), yet that
success was so closely associated with his name that such a
great historian as Baladhuri names him as the victor. Relying therefore
on such high authority, we may assert at least that the last victory of
ancient Iran was won under the auspices of Rustam.
Bahman conducted the
campaign with bravery as well as caution and allowed the Arab general
Abu Ubaid to cross and place the river Euphrates behind him. When,
therefore the Arab army emerged on the battlefield on the other side of
the river, it found no room for maneuvering: very soon it was driven
back on the river and hemmed in by a charge of elephants, while its
general was trampled to death by the White Elephant. Indeed, only the
skill of Mothanna, the lieutenant of Abu 'Ubaid, saved even a remnant of
three thousand men. As it was, had Bahman been able at this juncture to
pursue Mothanna, the Arab forces would have been entirely destroyed.
But, at that time, Firuzan, the leader of the party of Persians proper;
threatened the position of Rustam at the capital and thus the finest
opportunity that Persia ever had in this war was irretrievably lost. As
Sir W. Muir well observes, the one thing certain as regards the internal
history of Persia at this great crisis of the Empire was that "the
nobles sacrificed the empire to intrigue and jealousies". But, in spite
of all this, Rustam had certainly finished one campaign against the
Arabs with a decisive victory, a thing that had not been possible even
for the Emperor Heraclius with all his prestige as a military genius and
with the undivided resources of the Byzantine Empire at his disposal.
The Caliph Umar met
this great reverse with his usual courage and firmness; but even so, as
Baladhuri observes, "for one year after the calamity, that befell Abu
Ubaid and Salit, Umar refrained from the mention of Iran.10 Meanwhile,
however, Mothanna had gathered round his banner tribes of the frontier
including even Christian tribes like the Beni Namr. He then advanced
against the Persian general Mehran, who had reoccupied Hira. The battle
took place at Boweib; and this time, experience induced Arabs to remain
on the defensive and allow the Persians to cross the river and take the
risk of an offensive. The Persians were defeated in the fight though
the issue remained doubtful for some time.
The Arabs reaped the
fruits of their victory by the occupation of Mesopotama and the Delta,
while raids were being constantly made in other Persian territories to
obtain supplies and to strike terror. Moreover the Caliph Umar was
encouraged by the success to resume the invasion of Persia on a larger
scale; and he gave the leadership to Sad ibn-abi Waqqas, who had the
distinction of having been a Companion of the Prophet. Mothanna was
superseded partly because he "was a mere Bedouin chief", and partly
because he never really recovered from the wounds which he had received
at the battle of al-Jisr, wounds which shortly after proved fatal. But
before his death, he performed a great service to the Arab cause by
advising Sad to meet the enemy bettveen Qadissiyah and Udhaib "Fight
there the enemy," said the dying Mothanna, "for ye will be the victors;
and even if worsted, ye will still have the friendly and familiar desert
wastes behind. There the Persians cannot enter; and from thence ye will
again return to the attack." The army of Sad was swollen by the new
levy en masse ordered by the Caliph; and it contained "no fewer
than 1,400 Companions, and ninety-nine, who had fought at Bedr". As to
the total forces at the disposal of Sad accounts vary. Some put it
about 30,000 men, taking Mothanna 's command at eight thousand, a
similar number which Sad himself had brought up, and the Syrian levies
as well as the new levies from Yemen and the South. He wisely followed
the advice of the Caliph to practice patience and vigilance. He had
chosen his battlefield well, his right resting on a great swamp and his
rear and the other flank on the great Trench of Shapur, the fort of
Qodeis and the desert.
The advance in person
of Rustam who was now virtually the regent of Iran, though hampered by
his rival Firuzan, could only meet such a great danger. His effort was
worthy of his high position and energetic character. He retook much
lost territory, advanced on Hira, reconquered it and rebuked the
inhabitants for falling away from the old Empire. He is supposed to have
“crossed the Euphrates below Babylon, encamped for a time near the
ruined pile of Birs Namrud” and, passing by Najaf, faced the Arab army.
As regards the size of the army which he commanded, we have widely
different accounts. Some accounts put it as high as 200,000 men; others
estimate it at 120,000 men. Of these latter 40,000 men are supposed to
have formed the vanguard under Jalenus, 60,000 were in the main body
under Rustam. But as a high authority has put it, "it is all
guess-work".
Another account puts
the Arab army at only five to six thousand; according to this view, the
numerical superiority of the Arabs could not have been considerable.
This last account very probably errs on the side of paucity. One
element of Rustam's army deserves special notice. It consisted of a
battalion of four thousand men from Dailain and was called "Jund-i
Shahanshah", a sort of Imperial Guard. It would appear however that the
solidarity of this northern race with the other races of old Iran was
imperfect; for, on the death of Rustam, their contingent made terms with
the Arab invaders, accepted Islam and received stipends from the former.
One thing is obvious
that while the prudence and foresight of Umar placed the maximum
possible number of Arab troops at the disposal of Sad, Rustam did not
dispose of anything like the full military resources of the Persian
monarchy. Not only individual nobles, but the Empress-mother herself,
kept back very large bodies of troops, which, had they been joined to
Rustam's army, would have decisively turned the tide of battle. This is
obvious from the fact that very shortly after the battle of Qadissiyah,
another Persian noble, Nakhvargan, sallied from the capital to fight the
Arabs on his own account.
Similarly, when the
Arabs marched on the capital, the Empress despatched a third army
against them which fought with them valiantly at the battle of
Bahurashir being commanded by a veteran general designated as the “Lion
of Chosroes. Finally, soon after the fall of Medain, a fourth Persian
army fought with the Arabs at Jalula. Baladhuri informs us
that “the Persians were on this occasion led by Khurrahzad, a brother
of Rustam. The fight that ensued was the fiercest they ever had, in
which arrows and lances were used until broken to pieces, and swords
were applied until they were bent”. As another authority puts it, the
severity of this fourth battle "was not surpassed by the Night of
Clangor at Qadissiyah, excepting that it was shorter". But while the
bravery of the Persian forces was undoubted, it is obvious that these
masses were frittered away in successive engagements.
It remains to be added
that quite a large contingent of Armenians accompanied Rustam to the
battle-field. This was to be expected, since Rustam was the "ishkan" or
prince of Azarbaijan. On this point Caetani, Dulaurier and Patkanian
have collected much valuable information from old Armenian chronicles.
We learn from these sources that Varaz-Grigor (Gregorio), prince of
Alowan in Armenia, sent his forces under his brave son (named Jewansher)
to join the Persian army at Ctesiphon. The chronicles tell us that
Rustam "had hardly seen the young Armenian chief when he felt a great
sympathy for him and treated him as a brother or a son". This narrative
is important as showing prince Rustam’s kind and sympathetic manner of
treating his subordinates. And here we might refer to one Bahman Hajib,
who was the right-hand man of Rustam in thecampaign and who commanded
the confidence of the troops as no other officer in the Persian army
did. He was obviously a “fecht-general”, for we find him fighting and
meeting a hero's death in the front lines of battle; and he was the
first of the Iranian generals to fall on the field of honor.
Both Rustam and Sa’d
marched towards the great encounter with suitable caution. The former is
alleged to have taken four months to march from Medina to Qadissiyah;
and similarly, the latter left Medina in the spring while the battle was
fought in November of the same year. Rustam, as the defeated party,
has, however, received a greater share of blame. But both generals had
no doubt great pre-occupations to detain them. Sa'd was constantly
receiving reinforcements and required time to incorporate them into his
army. Rustam had to reconquer and reorganize much territory as his base
of operations, while he was certainly in no mood to respond to the
impatience of the Persian court, or to the intrigues of his enemies at
the court, who would have liked him to stake the fate of the Empire on a
single battle fought at the earliest opportunity.
A word might be said
about “the desponding dreams and auguries” of Rustam. No portents were
required from supernatural quarters to inform that commander of the
seriousness of his situation. The constant intrigues against him at the
Persian court, which at once denied him the forces which he had a right
to expect, and which put pressure on him to hasten the decisive
struggle, were by themselves the worst omens. He was no doubt also well
posted about the contemporary successes of the Arabs in Syria where they
had won the battles of Wacusa and Fihl and were taking Damascus. He
could not be ignorant that each of these successes made more and larger
reinforcements available for the invaders of Persia. Moreover, for
years the decline of the Persian monarchy had been obvious; thus the
patriotic heart of the Persian general might well have been oppressed by
this accumulation of unfavorable circumstances and he might well have
seen corresponding portents in the heavens, with the help of the then
fashionable science of astrology. But it might also be that Rustam
resorted to these divinations in order to check the precipitous haste
with which the court at Ctesiphon was bringing on a battle. Indeed one
anecdote preserved for us by Tabari indicates that Rustam himself
utilized either the skill or the dishonesty of the astrologers of the
royal court at Ctesiphon for his own purposes. Thus, the services of the
astrologer-royal, of one of his assistants and of an Indian astrologer
of the name of Zurna were employed by Rustam himself to obtain his
commission to march against the Arabs.
All authorities agree
that before the final struggle in the field, there were interviews
between Arab envoys and Rustam as well as with the king of Iran. On this
subject, too, there is a diversity of accounts. One of the envoys sent
by Sa’d to Rustam was al-Mughirah; and Baladhuri informs us that the
latter “betook himself towards Rustam's throne, in order to sit by him,
but was not allowed to do so by the Persian cavalry guard”. In the
course of the interview, Rustam used both diplomacy and a show of
superior force, as was indeed his true policy. That procedure is also
indicated in the Shah-Nameh.
According to another
account, Rustam sent the Arab embassy to King Yazdegard, who broke off
the interview in anger and rebuked Rustam for referring the envoys to
the court. But those historians who assume from Rustam’s “contemptuous
denunciations” of the Arab envoys that he was a man of “overweening
pride,” are surely mistaken. For exhibitions of resentment is
sometimes only an aspect of diplomacy. Moreover, we cannot rely on all
the details of these interviews as given to us. As one authority has
observed in the accounts of these wars and related transactions, "much
is drawn evidently from the imaginations of the traditions". As the
great Noldeke says “we must accept with great caution the sayings of
Arab warriors based on confused recollections”. For, in fact, the
events, the circumstances and the recollections were all confused.
The negotiations were
followed by three “days of grace”, granted to the Persians to consider
the terms offered by the Arab general. It is not too much to say that
this delay of three days was fatal to the Persian cause, since it
enabled the Syrian reinforcements commanded by that redoubtable warrior
al-Qa'qa to arrive at the critical juncture of the battle. It was he,
indeed who was the foremost champion on the Arab side, since Sa'd
himself was unable to mount his horse to lead the fight on account of
his illness.
At the end of that
time, Rustam invited the Arab commander to cross the river and begin
the battle. But the latter was too prudent to abandon his strong and
well-covered position. He left it to Rustam to cross the river in the
face of strong opposition and to seek an engagement with such a great
obstacle at his back. The Arabs stoutly defended the bridge of boats on
the river; but the Persian engineers managed to throw a dam across the
stream and their army crossed over, with Rustam encouraging his men by
observing "by tomorrow we shall have beaten them small". Whatever
despondency he might have felt at heart, it was his duty to hearten his
troops, and he performed it well.
As regards the
dispositions for the battle, our information is scanty and vague. But
we know that the wings of the Persian army were commanded by the
generals Hurmuzan (Satrap of Pars) and Mihran Bahram Razi, while Jalenus
led the advance guard. Pirozan was placed in command of the rear-guard.
Rustam had at his disposal 30 (or by other accounts 33) elephants. Of
these, 18 were placed in the center and the rest on the wings. Rustam
had a sort of throne made for himself from which he could direct the
operations. Prof. Christensen tells us that this was the constant
practice in battles royal of the Sasanian dynasty. What was unique in
this case was that the Persian prince kept in constant communication
with the court at Ctesiphon by an uninterrupted chain of men stationed
at suitable intervals, who could communicate the news of the events of
the battle to King Yazdegard. It was a human "telephone" that Rustam had
thus installed.
All accounts agree
that the first day of the battle was one of entire success for the
Persians, and that at the end of it, the Arabs and their leaders were in
a state of profound despondency. After the usual series of single
combats, the line of elephants advanced upon the Arab army and bore down
all before them. In vain, the bravest of Arab warriors performed deeds
of valour like those of Abu Mihjan. The elephants were not to be
denied. At last the Arab commander-in-chief appealed to the gallant
Asim of the Tamim tribe to stop the advance of elephants "at all costs".
Asim advanced with his archers against the elephants, shot down some of
the soldiers riding the elephants and cut the girths of their "howdahs".
As the "howdahs" fell to the ground the riders were massacred. But
though the advance of the elephants was thus stayed, the battle lasted
without interruption until sunset. No wonder that as Sir W. Muir says
“the Arab force was downcast.”
Ya'qubi, in his
account of the first day's battle, throws additional light on the
maneuvers of prince Rustam. According to him, that general attempted to
surprise the Arab commander in the castle of al-'Udzayb, whence he was
surveying the fight. But the Arabs rallied to the defence of their
general successfully and checked the attempt.
The second day of the
battle, however, opened well for the Arabs, since it brought
reinforcements for them from Syria. The advance guard of these succors
was led by al-Qa'qa; and it would not be too much to say (that to him
the Arabs owed the victory of Qadissiyah. His arrival gave great
confidence to his side, especially as he signaled his arrival by a
sudden attack on the leading Persian file, where he fought Bahman Hajib;
the victor of the battle of the Bridge.
Al-Qa’qa with two
other Arab warriors rushed against Bahman shouting that he wanted to
avenge Abu 'Ubaid and others who had perished in that battle. Bahman too
received help from two Persian champions, Pirozan and Bindawan. But
Al-Qa'qa struck down Pirozan while his companions smote the other two
Persians.
The Persians were
further dismayed as other parties of reinforcements came up in batches.
“The spirits of the Arabs rose”, observes Sir W. Muir, “and they forgot
the disasters of yesterday.”28 Above all, the Persians were fighting
without their former advantage, since the harness of their elephant
corps was being repaired, that equipment having been cut in the first
day of the battle, while with an improvised camel corps, the Arabs drove
back the Persian cavalry. But then Rustam descended from his post of
observation and restored the battle with the help of his
well-disciplined infantry. Thus closed “the day of Aghwath”, in which
the Arabs lost over 2,000 men; and, owing to such heavy mortality, Sa'd
dispensed with the ceremony of washing the bodies of the dead before
lowering them into hastily constructed tombs.
On the third day of
the battle (called Yaum. Ghimas or Imas) the event still remained
doubtful. But the arrival of Hisham with 700 more men from Syria
heartened the Arab troops, especially since by strategy these
reinforcements advanced at intervals in batches of 100 men; and thus the
succors were magnified. Meanwhile the harness of the elephants had been
repaired and they again advanced to the attack, But, acting on the
advice of some Persian refugees, al-Qa'qa, his brother Asim and others
advanced against these pachyderms and wounded them in their trunks and
eyes. Thus assailed, the elephants wavered for a time between the two
armies; but, later on, they charged through the Persian army and
stampeded across the canal. Rustam, however, succeeded in maintaining
the day. No wonder that, in the opinion of the great authority on the
battle, on Sayf b. Umar the Arabs would have been defeated on that day
but for the skill of al-Qa’qa and the arrival of reinforcements under
Hisham.30 We have also to remember when appraising the services of
al-Qa'qa to the Arab cause that he organized a sort of camel corps in
order to neutralize the advance of the Persian cavalry; for the horses
of the Persians were unaccustomed to the sight, sound, and the smell of
the camels. The result of this ruse of al-Qa'qa was a stampede of the
Persian cavalry into the lines of the infantry, which caused serious
trouble.
A confused struggle
raged throughout the third night of the battle, which has been made
famous in history under the designation of the “Laylah al-Harir”.
According to Caetani, the title alluded to the groans of pain heard
throughout its course; while Wellhausen supposes that the word "harir "
means suppressed cries of combating animals; for the two sides were now
too exhausted and furious to pronounce coherent challenges. It is
curious, adds Caetani, that in the struggle at Yermuk, too, there was a
night so named. On the Arab side, there were some moves attempted in
the course of this night, though only partially under the direction of
the High Command. Thus Sa'd ordered Tulayhah bin Khuwaylid to guard the
fords of the canal below the Arab position, lest the Persians might be
attempting a flanking movement. But Tulayhali could not resist the
temptation to cross the canal, and boldly carried out his design. He
was, however, driven back by the Persians across the canal. Other Arab
bands followed up this move and attacked the Persians shouting their own
tribal names to give some information to their leader of what was going
on. Sa'd had to pardon such acts of "brave indiscipline". Like the
Arabs; the Persians kept up shouting by tribes or regiments during the
second and third nights to keep up their confidence. Needless to add
that these night operations were in no sense directed by the generals on
either side. They marked the exhaustion as well as the exacerbation on
either side, and an effort to bring the battle to a speedy termination.
It was only on the
morning of the fourth day (Sunday) of the battle that the Persian army
gave way. One important factor in this was a terrific dust storm
which, as Sayf bin 'Umar has recorded, beat down even the pavilion under
which Rustam was watching and directing the operations. Weil has
justly observed that "as in Palestine the south wind forced the
Christians to fly before the followers of Islam, so at Qadissiyah such
clouds of dust were blown against the Magians by a west wind, so heavy
that even the pursuing Mohammedans could not see the faces of their
foes.
Another factor in the
Persian defeat was a last desperate charge advised by Qa'qa. As all
tents had been thrown down, Rustam who had been directing operations in
the center was compelled to take refuge under a mule laden with bags of
treasure; but one of the heavy bags of treasure fell on him and crushed
his back. Rendered thus incapacitated and incapable of defending
himself, Rustam threw himself into the canal in order to cross it and
was slain there. There are many accounts of his death. and many
claimants to the honor of terminating such a great career. The usual
account is that he was slain by Hillal bin ‘Ullafah. According to
Bala-dhuri however "Rustam was slain and his body was found covered
with so many blows and stabs that the one who gave the fatal blow could
not be determined.
Amir-bin-Madikarib,
Tulayhah ibn-Khuwaylid, Kurt ibn Jammah and Dirar ibnal-Azwar had all
rushed at him. Some say that Rustam was killed by Zuhair ibn-'Abd
Shams; others by 'Auwam ibn-'Abd Shams. In still another version, we
read that Rustam shot an arrow at Hillal who was riding towards him and
transfixed his foot to his stirrup. Upon this, Hillal rushed against
Rustam and dispatched him. However that may be, with the death of Rustam
the Persian army was in full flight.
On Rustam's death, no
one was left to lead the army back and hence, according to Tabari, it
lost 10,000 men in its flight besides those that had been killed in the
three earlier days. The army corps led by Pirozan and Hormuzan were
lucky in being the first to re-cross the dam at the canal al-Atiq;
but before Jalenus could follow with his corps, the dam was swept
away and that general was slain while trying to rally his men. Amongst
other noted fugitives were Zadz Buhaysh and Qarin, who came of a family
that had given many a noted warrior to old Iran.
It is noteworthy that
the Arab chronologist, Sayf bin 'Umar, to whom we owe so many traditions
of the great battle, has been at pains to preserve the names of some
brave Persian chiefs, who with their followers refused to retreat. They
preferred after the retreat to "die gloriously". On this role of honor
Sayf, and following him Tabari, places the names of Sharyar Kanara,
Hirbidz, Farrukhan Ahwazi and Khusrawshnum Hamdani. As Waqidi also
observes, "a group of Persians planting their banner firmly in the
ground said ‘we shall not leave our position until we die'." But
although such rallies were highly honorable to those who took a part in
them, they cost Persia the lives of generals who could be ill spared.
The same might be said of the struggle of Nakhveraghan at Dayr-I-Ka’b.
Thereafter, no generals were left who could direct the defence of
Ctesiphon.
Incidentally it might
be observed that in the mention of the brave Hirbidz we have the only
authority for the fact that men of the priestly caste served as fighting
officers during the Sasanian age.
Neither as a
tactician, nor as a strategist, could Rustam be said justly to have been
found wanting, and historians have not laid at his door the adverse
result of the great battle. As regards tactics, he could not be blamed
for the stampede of elephants, which was certainly a great misfortune
for the Persian cause; and he must be praised for restoring the battle
after that event. It was in fact the advent of great reinforcements
from Syria that decided the battle. Perhaps, Rustam had some inkling of
the imminent advent of these fresh hostile forces; and it was that
knowledge, and no "overweening confidence", that impelled him to cross
the canal al-Atiq and to bring on a battle with the well-chosen and
strong Arab position before him and the canal in his rear. For the
Iranian general was no rash assailant; and, as Caetani observes, Rustam
knew the weakness of the Persian Empire at the time. Had he been able to
prevail by a show of force, he would have been glad to return to
Ctesiphon with the laurels of a great moral victory. His long delay
before the battle showed that he was aware of Sa'd’s strategy of drawing
the Persian army into the desert-a region well known to Arabs and
adapted to their manoeuvres of cavalry but which would have been very
unfavorable to the Persians. Rustam's hands were also forced by Arab
raids on the one hand and by his king's injunctions on the other.
It is all to Rustam’s
credit that he faced the Arab invaders in the hardest fought battle that
they encountered either before or after. In none of the battles that
these invaders had fought in Syria with the forces of Heraclius had they
ever been brought so near defeat. It was no disgrace to prince Rustam
that he fell after a gallant struggle against a unique combination of
circumstances- the full tide of a Semitic national flood, the genius and
policy of Caliph 'Umar, the desperate bravery of warriors like al-Qa’qa,
Hashim and Tulayha, and finally the rage of nature itself as shown in
the furious dust storm, which went far to decide the result of the
well-fought field of al-Qadissiyah. It is also worth noting what a mass
of traditions - in fact, a veritable epic, has been constructed by the
Arabs about the Qadissiyah. In particular, the Iraqi school of
traditionalists has labored hard to embellish and ornament the epic of
this fight, while there is also a Medinah version which is less labored
& ornamented. Finally, in times to come, the fight of Qadissiyah served
as a standard and a pattern to the Arabs of what a really hard-fought
field was like. Thus, when the great battle of Siffin, with all the
ferocious intensity of a civil conflict, had to be described, it was
compared to that of Qadissiyah.
The importance, which
both friends and foes attached to the power and personality of Rustam,
was well illustrated soon after his death. Thus, four thousand
cavaliers from Day-lam, who had formed the "royal regiment" under Rustam,
did not hesitate to cast in their lot at once with the Arabs when he had
passed away, feeling that there was now no future with Persia.
Simultaneously, Christians belonging to the Bedouin tribes on both sides
of the Euphrates came to the Arab general and said: "Now that Rustam has
been slain, we will accept the new religion." Obviously, friend as well
as foe, regarded the death of Rustam as equivalent to the complete
triumph of the Arabs and the passing away of the Persian power; they
felt that as long as he lived, the prospects of the invaders were
doubtful indeed, but that with his death the doom of Persia was sealed.
What better epitaph
can a patriotic general either desire or require?
|
http://www.cais-soas.com/CAIS/History/Post-Sasanian/rustam_qadissiyah.htm