

# *The HISTORY OF IRAN and ISLAM*

*Selected texts from the authors*

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## ترجمه چیست ؟

در مورد تعریف ترجمه اتفاق نظر وجود ندارد. برخی از پژوهشگران ، ترجمه را هنر میدانند و بعضی دیگر آن را فن تعریف کرده اند و عده ای دیگر آن را علم می دانند .

بدیهی است که چنانچه ما به هریک از این موارد اعتقاد داشته باشیم ، نتایج خاص آنرا هم باید بپذیریم . مثلاً فردی که ترجمه را یک هنر میداند ، باید بپذیرد که این کار تحت تاثیر ویژگی های شخصیتی یا ذاتی مترجم خواهد بود . و چنانچه ترجمه را یک فن بدانیم ، باید بپذیریم که یک مترجم در نتیجه کار مداوم ، پشتکار ، ممارست و تمرین ، به توانایی های ارزشمندی در کار ترجمه خواهد رسید . و در صورتیکه ترجمه را یک علم بدانیم آنگاه باید بپذیریم که مترجم باید صرفاً با مبانی علمی و قوانین حاکم بر ترجمه آشنا بوده و شرط یک ترجمه خوب ، تطابق روش های علمی مترجم با اصول علمی است . در عین حال برخی زبانشناسان بر این باورند که ترجمه در نتیجه هر سه مورد فوق به کمال می رسد ، یعنی چنانچه فردی هنر ترجمه را داشته باشد ، فن آنرا بکار گیرد ، و روشهای علمی را بکار بندد ، آنگاه یک مترجم توانا خواهد بود . لذا برخی بر این باورند که ترجمه صرفاً نه هنر خلاق است و نه هنر تقلیدی ، بلکه در جایی بین این دو قرار دارد .

ترجمه به هیچ وجه عملی سطحی نیست که هر کس با حداقل دانش زبانی در باره زبان دیگر بتواند آنرا انجام دهد ، بلکه یکی از مشکل ترین کارهایی است که یک فرد می تواند به عهده بگیرد.

ترجمه چیزی بیش از آشنایی صرف با دو زبان را می طلبد .

در فرهنگ های لغت از جمله فرهنگ "رندم هاوس" ( Random House ) در تعریف "ترجمه" چنین آمده است :

نقل یک مکتب گفتاری یا نوشتاری از یک زبان به زبان دیگر یا زبان خود .

به رغم این تعریف ساده ، تعیین هدف ترجمه به علت گسترده بودن آن امری است بس دشوار .

اگر بپذیریم که هدف از ترجمه یک متن ، رسیدن به مفهوم و دستاوردهای آن متن است ، بنابراین دو نگاه در این زمینه قابل توجه است :

۱- گروهی که معتقدند باید متن را بصورت کلمه به کلمه ترجمه کرد و معنی کلی متن را نباید فدای لفظ و کلمه کرد . این افراد معتقدند که مغشوش بودن کلام ترجمه شده را باید با امانت داری در ترجمه ، جبران کرد .

۲- گروه دیگر بر این باورند که اگر منظور از ترجمه برقراری ارتباط با مخاطب باشد ، پس چنین ارتباطی جز با زبان دلخواه آنان بطور مطلوب میسر نخواهد بود . بر این اساس یک ترجمه موفق آن است که بتواند در خواننده متن (ترجمه شده) تاثیر شناختی ، احساسی و عاطفی یکسانی با متن مبداء (و اصلی) ایجاد کند . این گروه معتقدند که ترجمه یک نوع آفرینش است .

کاربرد مفاهیم و اصول فوق در متون تاریخی مشکل تر از آن است که بتوان در چند صفحه بدان پرداخت. اما باید توجه داشت که در متون تاریخی ، مهمترین نکته در "ترجمه امانتدارانه است که در عین حال بتواند

معني، احساس و درك واقعي نويسنده ي آن متن را به محقق تاريخ در زبان مقصد منتقل كند". چنين ترجمه اي (تحقيقاً اگر بدان توجه كنيم) بسيار مشكل تر از تاليف است.

بنابراين اگر بپذيريم كه هدف ترجمه ، انتقال معني از زبان ميديا به زبان مقصد است ، پس آنچه منتقل مي شود و بايد ثابت نگهداشته شود ، معنا است. فرض كنيد مي خواهيم جمله "خوابم مي آيد" را به انگليسي ترجمه كنيم . اين جمله فارسي از كلمات "خواب" (اسم ) و "م" (ضمير متصل فاعلي ) و "مي آيد" (فعل) ، تشكيل شده است . همين معني در زبان انگليسي به دو صورت بيان مي شود :

I am sleepy

I feel sleepy

در حاليكه معنای تحت الفظی جمله فارسی فوق به انگلیسی تقریباً این است :

My sleep comes

ملاحظه می کنید که هر دو زبان از شکل های مختلف انتخاب لغت و ساختار گرامری برای بیان مقصود استفاده می کنند . در فارسی از كلمات "خواب" (اسم ) ، "م" (ضمير) و "می آيد" (فعل) استفاده شده و در انگليسي از ضمير و صفت استفاده شده است .

### چگونه تلفظ انگليسي را فرا بگيريم؟ شما بايد:

۱- تلفظ همه اصوات انگليسي را به درستي فرا بگيريد. اصوات انگليسي و علائم فونتيك بين المللي (IPA) معمولاً در ابتدای ديكشنري های معتبر و بصورت يك جدول نشان داده شده اند. (به جدول زير توجه كنيد) علائم فونتيك سيستمي براي نوشتن تلفظ كلمات انگليسي است.

۲- تلفظ هر كلمه اي را كه به كار مي برید یاد بگيريد. در ديكشنري هاي خوب علائم فونتيك براي تمامي كلمات آورده شده است.

۳- نشانه دونقطه : باعث كشيدگی حرف می شود. به عنوان مثال a: صدای آی کشیده و i: صدای ئی کشیده می دهد.

۴- اگر قبل از حرف r ، يك حرف صداردار باشد ، حرف r در انگليسي بریتانیايي تلفظ نمي شود، اما در انگليسي آمريكايي هميشه تلفظ مي شود .

در بیشتر دیکشنریهای امروزی برای نشان دادن تلفظ کلمات از سیستم IPA استفاده می‌شود. در جدول زیر همه علائم و نشانه‌های IPA آورده شده است.

حروف واکه (صداها)		
IPA	words	Voice
ʌ	cup, luck	آ کوتاه
ɑ:	am, father	آ کشیده
æ	cat, black	آ
e	met, bed	ا متوسط
ə	away, cinema	ا کوتاه
ɜ:ɹ	turn, learn	ا کشیده
ɪ	hit, sitting	ای کوتاه
i:	see, heat	ای کشیده
o	hot, rock	ا متوسط
ɔ:	door, four	ا کشیده
u	put, could	او کوتاه
u:	blue, food	او کشیده
aɪ	five, eye	آی
aʊ	now, out	او
oʊ	go, no	او
eəɹ	where, air	ا
eɪ	say, eight	ای
ɪəɹ	near, here	ای
ɔɪ	boy, join	ای
ʊɹ	Tour, poor	ا

حروف همخوان (بی‌صدا)		
IPA	words	Voice
b	bad, lab	ب
d	did, lady	د
f	find, if	ف
g	give, flag	گ
h	how, hello	ه
j	yes, yellow	ی
k	cat, back	ک
l	leg, little	ل
m	man, lemon	م
n	no, ten	ن
ŋ	sing, finger	نگ
p	pet, map	پ
r	red, try	ر
s	sun, miss	س
ʃ	she, crash	ش
t	tea, get	ت
tʃ	check, teacher	چ
θ	think, three	ت عربی
ð	this, mother	ذ عربی
v	voice, five	و
w	wet, window	و عربی
z	zoo, lazy	ز
ʒ	pleasure, vision	ژ
dʒ	just, large	ج

## برخي كلمات اختصاري :

ممکن است در متون تاریخی به زبان انگلیسی به علائم اختصاری برخورد کنید که بصورت مخفف آمده و منظور از آن عبارت خاصی است ، مانند موارد زیر:

- c.f. ..... مقایسه کنید با
- e.g. .... مثلاً
- i.e. .... به عبارت دیگر
- etc. .... الي آخر ، غیره
- q.v. .... آنچه که بعداً مي آید
- cp. .. در مقایسه با
- esp. .... بویژه
- CE. .... دوره عمومي

## THE ARAB CONQUEST OF IRAN AND ITS AFTERMATH:

The Muslim Arabs' disastrous defeat of the *Sasanian* Empire opened a new chapter in the long history of Iran. In distant *Hijāz* in the city of Mecca, *Muhammad b. Abd-Allāh* had given to an idolatrous and strife-ridden people a new religion, which inculcated monotheism, its message coming to *Muhammad* as Revelation, conveyed to his Community later in the *Qur'ān*, and bade the Arabs to submit as people accountable to God and fearful of his wrath. Some of them were so inspired by this new teaching that they undertook the conquest of the world about them, to achieve at the same time in this holy war the reward of a share in the world to come, Paradise. *Muhammad's* death in 11/632 was followed in his successor *Abū Bakr's* time by a crisis of apostasy, the *Ridda*, which put both the religion and the government of *Medina* in jeopardy. The end of the *Ridda* wars left the Arabs poised for Holy War for the sake of Islam, ready to challenge even Byzantium and Iran. From ancient times Iran had had contacts varying in degree of closeness and amity with the Arabs. Before the Sasanian era, Arab tribes had settled in the Tigris-Euphrates region. In *Hira* on the right or west bank of the Euphrates resided the House of *Mundhir* of the *Lakhmid* Arabs, who were generally accounted the tributaries of the Sasanians, as their rivals, the *Ghassānids*, in the desert of north Syria, were the clients and vassals of Byzantium. The *Lakhmids* frequently aided the Iranians in their contests with Byzantium. *Khusrau II Aparviz* (591-628), according to Arab tradition, found refuge with *Nu'mān Abū Qābūs*, *Nu'mān III*, King of *Hira*, when fleeing from *Bahrām Chubin*, but when restored to his throne, he ill repaid this assistance by seizing *Nu'mān*, having him thrown beneath an elephant's feet, and divesting his family of *Hira*. And *Hira* had in effect become an appanage of Iran. This was the end of *Lakhmid* power. The reason for this imprudence on *Khusrau II's* part is not clear. It is possible that his leanings towards *Nestorianism*, whose adherents had promoted a conspiracy against the shah, might have motivated *Khusrau* against him, especially since the shah had every reason to fear the influence of the Christians in his own court. But the later calamitous events between Arabs and Iranians revealed how lacking in foresight the elimination of this "puppet" *Lakhmid* house had been. The first warning was the battle known as *Dhūqār*, from the name of the place, near the present-day *Kūfa*, where it occurred. The tribes of *Bakr b. Wā'il*, of the vicinity of *Hira*, were dissatisfied with the new ruler of *Hira*, *Iyās* of *Tayy*. They began raiding across the Iranian border. Near *Dhūqār* they fell in with two parties of Iranian horse, each comprising a thousand troopers.

The episode came to be sung in Arabic legend and verse as one of the *ayyam* : the Arabs' Heroic Days. The *Bakr* tribesmen took heart from their success on this day; their raids on the Iranian frontiers increased. The first major encounter between the Muslims' and Iran occurred during the reign of the first caliph, *Abū Bakr* (11-13/632-4). The taking of *Hira* and the pillage of the Arab-inhabited areas on the banks of the Euphrates had only just been completed when *Abū Bakr's* orders reached *Khalid*, to decamp with his army for *Syria*. This departure of *Khalid* from what might be described as the "Iranian front" demonstrates that *Abū Bakr* had as yet no ready plan for the conquest of Iran; rather the Muslims' main preoccupations in those days were still associated with the aftermath of events of the last days of the Prophet's life, and were centred on the "Syrian Problem". *Umar b. al-Khattab* succeeded as caliph. *Khalid* was still engaged in Syria and against Byzantium. Apprehensive on account of news of the Arab successes against Byzantium, the Iranians also turned their attention to the Euphrates situation, and now hastened to defend that frontier against the Arabs. This defence was entrusted to *Rustam b. Farrukhzad*, the commander of armies in *Āzarbāijān*. For a while the two armies confronted each other on the western side of the Euphrates at *Qādisīya*. Though these figures are not free from exaggeration, there can be no doubt that the numbers of the Persians were appreciably greater. On the final day *Rustam* was killed and his army dispersed in flight. Amongst the quantities of spoils which fell into Arab hands was the banner which these victors termed the banner of *Kābiyān*. The battle's importance for the Arabs was such that it became subject to grandiose treatment in poetry and legend, a reason for treating traditions relating to it with caution. Two months later, in accordance with the caliph's orders, *Sa'd* marched towards *Madā'in* or Ctesiphon, the celebrated Sasanian capital. Before their arrival *Yazdgard* with a retinue of several thousand people and all his treasure had left Ctesiphon. Ctesiphon's gates were opened to the Arabs, and the booty, which according to the account given by *Balādhurī* consisted of carpets, dresses, arms, jewels and so forth, astonished the Bedouin soldiers. Then as is well known the caliph sent one of the Prophet's own Persian *mawālī* or clients, *Salmān Fārsī*, whose Iranian name is recorded as *Māhbeh* or *Rūzbeh* and who is said originally to have been an adherent of Christianity before his travels took him into the orbit of *Muhammad* at *Medina*, to be governor at Ctesiphon. In spite of the victory which had been gained, 'Umar did not evince any great eagerness to embark on extended conquests.

This was neither acceptable to the Iranians who had lost their capital, nor to the Arab warriors, aroused by the hope of further booty and imbued with hope of admission to Paradise, hopes not to be realized by a status quo. *Yazdgard*, who saw his throne lost, decided after *Jalūlā* once more to equip an army and make an attempt to rid Iraq of the Arabs, or at least prevent their invasion of western Iran. *Nihāvand* was considered suitable for this last stand. The engagement lasted three days, from Tuesday to Friday. *Nu'mān* was killed, but the battle was continued and the Iranian forces were defeated and fled from their last stand. With this victory of *Nihāvand*, which the Arabs called the "Victory of Victories", the Iranians' last concerted stand against the Muslims was smashed. Concerning the real cause of this collapse, there has been much debate. Certainly one of the causes was the marked difference between classes then prevalent in Iran, and the lack of co-operation between them. Another was the differences of religion which existed, for, together with a tendency towards fatalism and belief in the power of destiny, ideas which prepared the Iranian people to accept defeat. Also, the cupidity and corruption of the mobads and their interference in politics had raised hatred against them. Another factor was the weakness of a government that in the course of four years put no less than eight rulers one after the other on the throne. Further, the aimless wars of *Khusrau II* also played their part in weakening the government and its finances. Certainly the conquest of Iran, contrary to the account of *Saif b. Umar*, did not by any means reach its completion in the time of the caliphate of *'Umar b. al-Khattab*; it in fact continued into Umayyad times, the Umayyad caliphate having begun in 41/661. During the caliphate of *'Umar* and in the early years of *Uthmān*, Iraq, *Jibāl* and *Fars* came under the domination of the new conquerors in such a complete way that the revolutions of the latter part of *Uthmān's* time, and even the sanguinary civil wars in *Ali's* brief caliphate, afforded various claimants for the Sasanian throne no opportunity to rally any support or popular sympathy for a general rebellion or an attempt to restore Iranian independence. Nevertheless, the people of some provinces to whom submission to the Arabs and acceptance of their new faith were not agreeable, used every available opportunity to contend with their conquerors. Thus after the murder of *Umar b. al-Khattab* the people of the district of *Shāpūr* rose and *Kazarun* was engulfed in rebellion. In the early months of the caliphate of *Uthmān*, when *Sa'd b. Abī Waqqās* for the second time made governor of *Kūfa*, the people of *Hamadān* and *Ray* staged an insurrection against the Arabs. *Yazdgard's* last refuge was *Marv*, whose governor was the *Māhōē Sūrī* already mentioned, who seems to have belonged to the great Suren family.

The monarch required of him taxes fallen into arrears. The governor incited some Hephthalites under their ruler *Nīzak* against him, and when the unfortunate monarch learned of the plot, fleeing the city he fell the victim of a nameless assassin in a mill in 31/651. Iran's submission to Islam, moreover, was only a very gradual process. Although the majority of them by becoming Muslim gained their freedom. But it was a qualified freedom, for they became *mawālī* (clients) of the Arabs, freed slaves but still dependants who, as second-class citizens, could be exposed to illtreatment and the contumely of the Arab Muslims. When the Sasanian government fell, people who in accordance with the precepts of the *Qur'ān* were recognized as "People of the Book", that is to say the Jews and Christians, could continue in their former faith as *dhimmīs*, members of a recognized confession, on payment of the *jizya*. Moreover Islam for them spelt liberation from forced labour and military service, which in Iran formerly they had been bound to perform. They enjoyed more liberty in the performance of their religions than had been accorded them under the regime of the Zoroastrian clergy. In return for the *jizya* Islam took them under its protection. Muslim treatment of the Zoroastrians varied in accordance with the policies of the caliphs and attitudes of different governors. After the time of *Uthmān* the *dhimmīs* in Iraq and Iran lived fairly comfortably. But the Umayyad governor *Hajjaj*, who went so far as to exact the *jizya* from monks because he was of the opinion that people became monks to avoid the tax. Muslim treatment of Magians in the Umayyad period, particularly in *Fars* and *Khurasan*, gradually became increasingly contemptuous and intolerable. It was for this reason that a group of them in order to preserve their ancient religion, by way of the Persian Gulf, there to found a colony in India. The adherents of other Old Iranian religions, such as Manichaeism and even *Mazdakism*, found in the time of the Arab invasion more scope than they had enjoyed under the Sasanians for the practice of what had to the latter been heterodoxies, to be suppressed. With the death of *Uthmān* the centre of the caliphate moved from *Medina* to *Kūfa* in Iraq, a city which had been built near to the ancient *Hira* and half of whose inhabitants were non-Arabs. *Ali b. Abī Tālib*, the new caliph, had a considerable following in Iraq both from among the *Yemenī* Arabs and from among non-Arab Muslim elements, those who were known as *mawālī*. The caliph *Ali*, unlike *Uthmān*, was sympathetic towards the *mawālī* and treated them with respect, to the extent of arousing complaints on this score from his compatriots.

At the bottom of the *Shī'ī* reverence for the *imām* - the Prophet's successor - and the conception that the leadership of the community was a divine and extraordinary office, lay the Iranians belief that the *farr-i īzādī*, the Divine Power or *Aura*, should be an essential attribute of the exercise of sovereignty. In contrast the *Khārijites* may be said to have been a "puritan" party in Islam, entertaining extreme democratic views verging on the anarchistic. The *mawālī* habit of seeking refuge from Arab oppression in the encampments of the *Khārijites* and joining in their fighting continued until the end of Umayyad times. Similarly in the *Shī'ī* struggles against the *Umayyads*, the *mawālī* played a part. Although in the rising of *Hujar b. Adī* (51/671) and that of *Husain b. Alī* at *Taff* (61/680) the complexion was completely Arab, with the insurrection of *Mukhtar* the *mawālī* were with the *Shī'īs*; in *Mukhtar's* army, as is well attested, were twenty thousand of the *Hamra*, the *Kūfan mawālī*, all of Iranian origin. *Mukhtar's* pretext for rising against the Umayyads was to exact revenge from the slayers of *Husain b. Ali*. At the time, however, even the *Shī'īs* were doubtful of his sincerity. *Mukhtar* exhibited a special skill in gaining the support of the *mawālī*, and their numbers in his forces became so great that the movement might be accounted a movement against the Arabs of Iraq. The *Kūfan* Arabs were disconcerted by his special regard for the *mawālī* elements; the complaint gained ground that in his camp not a word of Arabic could be heard. The important result achieved by *Mukhtar's* insurrection was the emergence of the *mawālī* in Iraq as a fighting force to be reckoned with. For example, a few years later, *Zaid b. Alī*, *Husain b. Alī's* grandson, come out against the Umayyads. A short time afterwards, in the year 125/742-3, his son, *Yahyā b. Zaid*, rebelled in *Khurasan*. The Umayyads, having regard to the extraordinary way in which the realms of Islam had expanded and to the variety of elements which now composed the Muslim community, became aware that religion alone was not sufficient as a base for a great empire; some kind of national feeling was also required. They placed the caliphate on a new kind of footing, changing it into a government - an Arab government - which depended upon the protection of the Arab tribes. Nevertheless *Mu'awiya* made the caliphate like kingship, hereditary in his own family, and gradually by the introduction of various ceremonies and types of etiquette, transformed it into something much more resembling an Arab monarchy, its *raison d'etre* the defence of the Arab tribes. Enough has been said to illustrate the harsh treatment of the *mawālī* in the matter of taxation by *Umayyad* governors who tended to make no distinction between Muslim converts and the *dhimmīs*.

Indeed, during the century that had elapsed since the conquest of the *Jibal* and *Khurasan*, the Umayyads had changed the Islamic theocracy into something that could only be described as an Arab government, and the enthusiasm and idealism of Islam had been so much weakened that a rising of a group of discontented people in *Khurasan* under the title of protecting the Faith and the Family of the Prophet was sufficient to overthrow the Arab government. After the conquest of Iran by Arabs, the *dihqans*, or landed aristocracy, of Sasanian times remained under the new Islamic dispensation as the government's representatives in rural areas. From the *dhimmīs*, besides *kharāj*, which only applied to those holding land, was also taken the *jizya*, so long as they remained non-Muslim. *Hajjāj b. Yūsuf*, the harsh governor of Iraq, returned to their villages by force those *mawālī* who fled their lands. In addition he used to extract from them the *jizya*, illegally, of course, since according to Islamic law they were exempt from this on conversion.

#### **The ABBĀSID government:**

There was little possibility of open Shia propaganda making any head way in Iraq because of Umayyad power. According to the sources, the secret propaganda was initiated by Muhammad b. al-Hanafīyya, Ali b. Abi Talib's son (not by Fatima, the Prophet's daughter, but by a wife from the Banu Hanifa). With the rising of Abd-Allah b. Zubair, however, who in a sense was his rival and opponent, this opportunity was not granted. Then, His son, Abd-Allah b. Muhammad, known as Abū Hashim, continued his father's secret propaganda but found no opportunity to stage a rising. On the death of Abū Hashim, several different groups of Shi'is appeared, each claiming that Abū Hashim had assigned the task of leadership to their particular imam. The essence of the propaganda was exploitation of stories of the Umayyad's abandoning Islam, and exciting the people into support for the Prophet's family by raising hope of the advent of the promised Mahdi. In the end the 'Abbāsīd propaganda in *Khurasan* was declared openly by Abū Muslim. This was to lay the preliminaries for publishing a propaganda the foundations of which had been prepared for twenty years in secret. For a time he continued the propaganda in *Khurasan* in secret until the imam ordered the publication of it. Abū Muslim made the propaganda public in the house of Sulaimān b. Kathir, in the village of Safidhanj near Marv in Ramadān 129/May-June 747. The final and most important engagement took place near Mosul in northern Iraq. Then Iraq and Syria were in the hands of the *Khurasanis*, to be followed by Egypt and Arabia.

The Umayyad government had been overthrown by the Iranians and given way to that of the 'Abbāsids. Nevertheless the new government very soon disappointed its supporters; Arab and mawālī hopes were dashed. For a few years Abū Muslim managed to maintain his power in Khurasan, but very soon he fell a victim to the suspicion and morbidity of the second Abbāsīd caliph, Mansūr, to be treacherously put to death. The Abbāsīds claimed that recognition of their right to the caliphate was obligatory, and that they received their authority by divine mandate and not by the agreement of men. Up to this moment, Abbāsīd propaganda had been carried out and the oath of allegiance taken in the name of *al-ridā min āl Muhammad*, "the one of Muhammad's family who would be agreed upon" a designation which left room for both Abbāsīds and Alids. The success of the Abbāsīd revolution has often been viewed as a success by Iranians over Arabs; but a very great number of the soldiers and propagandists who won and maintained Abbāsīd rule were Arabs. If, however, many of the soldiers in the first Abbāsīd army were of Arab ancestry, the army was seen not as Arab or Iranian but as Khurasanian. Abū Muslim's importance as the living link between the emerging central government and the province from which it drew its military manpower and its most fervent adherents was now made apparent by the long series of revolts in Khurasan which followed his execution. The first of these was the revolt of Sunbād̲h in 138/75 5. Sunbād̲h was not a Muslim and the participation of non-Muslims in most of these revolts indicates how much the non-Arab peoples of Iran and Transoxiana had felt somehow identified with the state under Abū Muslim. The revolts of Ustād̲hsīs and al-Muqanna like that of Sunbād̲h had extensive local support. The rising of al-Muqanna had a more specifically religious colouring. Remarkable Barmakids family was descended from the hereditary high priest of a Buddhist temple near Balkh. Khālīd b. Barmak was an adherent of the Abbāsīd cause at the end of the Umayyad period, and an important officer in the first Abbāsīd army. Abul-Abbās put him in charge of the two important ministries of the army (jund) and land tax. Under al-Mansūr he was demoted to the governorship of Fārs. Barthold believed that the role of the Barmakids in the central government symbolized the co-operation of the Iranian "squirearchy" or class of dihqāns with the ruling family, and that the downfall of the Barmakids signalled the end of such co-operation. Under al-Ma'mūn appeared the most serious movement of local opposition in Western Iran since the Abbāsīd Revolution.

The rebellion of Bābak, a Mazdakite, which had begun at Badh between Arrān and Āzarbāijān in 200 or 201/816, continued an older tradition of Mazdakite or "Khurrami" resistance to Abbāsīd government in that part of Iran. The movement of Bābak left followers in most parts of Iran, and several Iranian nobles were his adherents. But the violent rebellion of Māzyār, a king of Tabaristān who had become a Muslim at the hands of al-Ma'mūn, would have taken place even without Bābak's encouragement. When al-Mu'tasim died on 18 Rabī I 227/5 January 842, he left his heir a prisoner of the Turkish soldiers. Al-Mu'tasim had moved the capital to Sāmarrā in 221/836 more to separate the Turks from outside influences. The principal events of al-Mutawakkil's reign were related to his attempts to free himself from his dependency on the Turks. The alarming frequency with which the Turkish generals now changed caliphs made the next decade a period of confusion in which the degradation of the 'Abbāsīd caliphate seemed irreversible. With Ahmad b. Būya's conquest of Baghdad, Iraq was again loosely tied politically with western Iran where his two brothers had large kingdoms of their own. This conquest therefore revived the long political association of Iraq and Iran, and ended the Abbāsīd attempt to make Iraq the centre of an empire whose heartlands included Egypt and Syria as much as it included the Iranian plateau. The Abbāsīd Empire, for all its real or imagined family likeness to earlier Iranian Empires, remained a Mesopotamian empire. The second Abbāsīd empire was militarily limited, but ideologically successful. In the vast majority of cases, the Abbāsīds had disguised their loss of power by giving the new independent rulers deeds delegating the caliph's authority to them by official appointment. The independent rulers wanted these deeds of appointment for, as Bīrūnī wrote in the 5<sup>th</sup> /11<sup>th</sup> century, "the common people in the large cities have become accustomed to the Abbāsīd claim, and have been inclined to their rule, and obey them out of a sense of religion, and consider them possessed with the right to command".

### **The Tāhirids and Saffārids and Sāmānids:**

During the 3rd century, four generations of the *Tāhirid* family succeeded each other hereditarily as governors for the *Abbāsīd* caliphs (205-59/821-73). The line is thus often considered as the first dynasty in the east to make itself autonomous of the caliphs in Iraq. The *Tāhirids* were culturally highly arabicized, but they were nevertheless Persians.

The firm and generally just rule which they gave to the eastern Iranian world favoured a material and cultural progress, whereas earlier, the indigenous older Iranian culture had been weakened by the dynamic impact of Islamic religion and Arab political dominance. The *Tāhirids* thus had fifty years of unbroken rule in *Khurāsān*, but it is dubious whether one should speak of them as a separate dynasty there. The evidence seems to show that the *Tāhirids* were retained in *Khurāsān* because the Caliphate in Iraq was increasingly unstable and its direct authority over outlying provinces was shrinking. The *Tāhirids* gave firm government to a large part of Persia, respected the constitutional rights of the caliphate and gave as little trouble as could be expected. The *Saffārids* made the first great breach in the territorial integrity of the Abbāsīd caliphate. *Ya'qūb b. al-Laith*, achieved power in *Sīstān* with no advantages of birth or official connections. Accordingly, this regime only endured whilst the Saffārid amirs had the vigour to hold their territories against rivals. When the caliphs confirmed the conquests of *Ya'qūb* and *'Amr*, this was done only grudgingly. It was, in fact, the Samanids of Transoxiana who in the end overthrew *Amr b. al-Laith*, wrested Khurasan from the Saffārids. *Ya'qūb b. al-Laith* first rose to prominence through joining one of these 'ayyār bands. He had been born in one of the villages of *Sīstān* and had worked at the humble trade of coppersmith (Arabic *saffār*, whence the dynasty's name). He and his three brothers, *'Amr*, *Tāhir* and *'Alī*, had military ambitions. One of the most important aspects of early Saffārid policy, of significance for the spread of Islam in Afghanistan and on the borders of India long after their empire had collapsed, was that of expansion into eastern Afghanistan. It was increasingly apparent that *Tāhirid* power in *Khurāsān* was crumbling. On the western fringes, *Tāhirid* authority was threatened by the *Zaidī Shī'ī* movement in *Tabaristān* under *al-Hasan b. Zaid*. After his successes in *Herāt*, *Fārs* and eastern Afghanistan, *Ya'qūb* felt strong enough directly to provoke a war with the *Tāhirid* amir. In 259/873 *Ya'qūb* entered the capital of *Khurāsān* without striking a blow, and ended the fifty years' dominion there of the *Tāhirids*. *Amr b. al-Laith* succeeded his brother *Ya'qūb* as amir. The re-establishment of Saffārid control in *Khurāsān* was to be a lengthy process. *'Amr's* downfall was now brought about by pride. He aspired to follow his *Tāhirid* predecessor in extending his overlordship beyond the *Oxus*. This was a provocation of the *Sāmānids* of Transoxiana, who claimed to exercise suzerainty over the *Afrīghid Khwārazm-Shāhs*. The *Sāmānids* took over *Khurāsān*, and were to hold it for a century until the coming of the *Ghaznavids*. It is, indeed, abundantly clear that the caliphs and the Saffārids never trusted each other for one moment.

The investiture diplomas were swiftly cancelled when Saffārid fortunes flagged, when there still seemed chances of restoring the Tāhirids to Khurāsān and when the rising power of the orthodox and obedient Sāmānids could be used against the Saffārids. In 298/911 Sāmānid rule had been imposed on Sistān, and Mansur b. Ishāq, the amir Ahmad b. Ismail's cousin, was made governor there in 299/912. The Sāmānid state had received recognition in the year 261/875 when the caliph al-Mu'tamid sent the investiture for all of Transoxiana to Nasr b. Ahmad, in opposition to the claims of Ya'qub b. Laith the Saffārid. Ismā'il enlarged the Sāmānid domain in all directions. In 280/893 he raided to the north and captured the city of Tarāz and much booty was taken. Since after the defeat of 'Amr b. Laith, Ismā'il had received from the caliph investiture over Tabaristān as well as Khurāsān, Ray and Isfahān, he decided to annex these realms to his own. Ismā'il has come down in history not so much as a capable general or as a strong ruler, although he was both, but rather as the epitome of the just and equitable ruler. Isma'il was loyal to the caliph but there is no evidence that he, or any of the Samanid rulers, paid tribute or taxes to Baghdad. Gifts were sent, for this was normal procedure. Isma'il became sick and died in the month of Safar 29. He was succeeded by his son Ahmad. The province of Tabaristān, broke away from the Sāmānids with the revolt of a Zaidī Shī'ī leader called Nāsir al-Kabīr. Ahmad died in Jumādā II 301/January 914 and his son succeeded him at the age of eight. Nasr b. Ahmad, surnamed Sa'id "the fortunate", was just that in having Abū 'Abd-Allāh al-Jaihānī as his prime minister. The organization of the Sāmānid state was modelled after the caliph's court in Baghdad with its central and provincial divisions. Slaves, just as in Baghdad, could rise to high positions of authority, and the palace school for court slaves is described in detail by Nizām al-Mulk in his *Siyāsat-namā*. Just as at Baghdad, so in Bukhārā Turkish slaves eventually succeeded in usurping authority and the ruler became almost a puppet in their hands. One of the reasons for the efforts of the early Sāmānids to expand their boundaries to the north and east was much more to obtain slaves than to spread Islam. The missionaries who followed the Sāmānid armies, however, did convert many pagans in the course of time. One feature of the last part of Sāmānid rule in both Transoxiana and Khurāsān was the decline of the dihqān class. Not only the rise of the Turks through the slave system of the court, but also the decline of the countryside caused the impoverishment of the dihqāns. The Sāmānid amirs were devout Muslims, and except for the interlude when Nasr b. Ahmad flirted with the Ismā'īlīs, they remained Sunnīs of the Hanafī persuasion.

The literati who flourished at the courts of the early Sāmānids, such as Rūdakī, continued to enjoy favour later. Not only were religious works translated from Arabic into Persian by order of the Sāmānid amirs, but secular works too were not neglected. The vizier Abū 'Alī Muhammad Balamī started his work on the translation of Tabarī's great history into Persian in 352/963 and finished it a few years later. It was the Sāmānid court which initiated interest in preserving the pre-Islamic Iranian past and Firdausi was the result of that interest. Perhaps the main theme of the Shāh-nāma is the conflict between Iran and Turan, whose people in Firdausī's day were considered to have been the ancestors of the Turks. The end of the dynasty was longer delayed than many expected because the loyalty of the people to the house of Sāmān, in spite of incompetent rulers, persisted for a time. A year before he died in the summer of 366/976, Amir Mansur gave the post of vizier to Abu 'Abd Allah Ahmad b. Muhammad Jaihani, grandson of the famous Jaihani mentioned above, but the new vizier could accomplish little more than his immediate predecessors. In the west the powerful Buyid ruler 'Adud al-Daula was able to wrest Kirman from nominal Samanid overlordship and to prevail most of the time in Tabaristan and Gurgan against the Ziyarid ruler Qabus b. Vushmgir, the ally of the Samanids. The Samanids tried to recover lost lands in the west, but they were not able to prevail against the Buyids. Nuh II b. Mansur was a youth when he ascended the throne, and he was assisted by his mother and a new vizier Abu'l-Husain 'Abd-Allah b. Ahmad 'Utbi, of the same family as a previous vizier. The army of Khurasan, now the only real standing army of the Samanids, was assembled and led against the Buyids later in the same year 372/982, but after initial successes it was decisively defeated by the Buyids and only 'Adud al-Daula's death kept the Buyids from invading Khurasan. The Qarakhanid ruler Bughra Khan moved in 381 into Samanid territory and the first army sent against him by Amir Nuh b. Mansur was completely defeated. In 387/997 both Nuh and Sebiik-Tegin died, leaving very different successors. Nuh's son Abu'l-Harith Mansur II was too young to control his strong associates. Mahmud saw an opportunity to assert his claims as the avenger of the deposed amir, so he set out for Nishapur, but he realized that his enemies, Bektuzun and Fa'iq, together with the Simjurid Abu'l-Qasim, were possibly too strong for him, so he made peace with them in the early spring of 389/999, retaining Balkh and Herat under his rule. The allies did not trust Mahmud and attacked the rearguard of his army without, however, defeating Mahmud.

War was renewed and this time near Marv he decisively defeated the allies. Mahmud now secured all of the lands south of the Oxus River. Even the rulers of Chaghaniyan and others north of the river submitted to him, and he appointed his brother Nasr governor of Khurasan. Power had definitely passed from the Samanids to the Ghaznavids south of the Oxus. The Qarakhanids entered the capital without resistance and Bektuzun surrendered, while 'Abd al-Malik was taken prisoner. The Muslim Turks accomplished what the pagan Turks could not have done; the Qarakhanids brought an end to the Samanid dynasty and Iranian rule. Thereafter Turks ruled in Central Asia. There was a romantic postlude to the story of the Samanids. A younger brother of Mansur b. Nuh and of 'Abd al-Malik called Isma'il escaped from the Qarakhanid prison and fled to Khwarazm where he gathered support for the Samanid cause. He took the name Muntasir, "victorious", and he was successful at first in driving the Qarakhanids from Bukhara and then from Samarqand. But then the main Qarakhanid army was mobilized and at its approach Muntasir had to abandon all of his conquests and flee to Khurasan. The descendants of the Samanid family continued to live in the oasis of Bukhara and they were highly regarded by the populace and were well treated by the government in later times. The memory of the Samanids, not only as the last Iranian dynasty in Central Asia, but that dynasty which unified the area under one rule and which saved the legacy of ancient Iran from extinction, lasted long in Central Asia. Indeed, in many ways the Samanids were compared with the Sasanids. Furthermore, the Samanids had shown how ancient Iranian culture could be compatible with Islam. This was the great contribution of the Samanids to the world of Islam, and of course, to Iran. The *Sāmānid* amirate in *Transoxiana* and *Khurāsān* meant that there was a strong barrier in the northeast against mass incursions from the steppes into the civilized zone. Again, this army followed the *Abbāsīd* pattern in that it had a core of Turkish slave guards (*ghilmān*, *mamālīk*) personally attached to the amīr. Hence during the heyday of the *Sāmānids* - up to the middle of the 4th century - the frontiers of *Transoxiana* were held firm against pressure from the Turks outside. During this period of *Sāmānid* florescence, large numbers of individual Turks were brought through *Transoxiana* into the Islamic world. Much of the economic prosperity of the *Sāmānid* state was built on the slave trade across its territories. These considerations clearly play a large role in the decline and fall of the *Sāmānid* Empire in the second half of the 4th/10th century, and in the rise from its ruins of two major dynasties, the *Qarakhānids* to the north of the *Oxus* and the *Ghaznavids* to the south of that river.

The *Ghaznavids* arose indirectly from this atmosphere within the *Sāmānid* Empire of disintegration, palace revolutions and succession *putschs*. The Turkish Commander-in-Chief of the *Sāmānid* forces, the *hājib Alp-Tegin*, in 350/961 allied with the vizier *Abū 'All Muhammad Bal'aamī* to place their own candidate for the amirate on the throne. The coup failed, and *Alp-Tegin* was obliged to withdraw to *Ghazna* in eastern *Afghanistan*, on the far periphery of the *Sāmānid* Empire. One of *Alp-Tegin's* most trusted supporters was the *ghulām Sebük-Tegin* (probably to be interpreted as Turkish "beloved prince"). *Sebük-Tegin* accompanied *Alp-Tegin* to *Ghazna*, passing into the service of the latter's son *Abū Ishāq Ibrāhīm*, and quietly building up a following among the Turks in *Ghazna*. In 366/977 the Turks of *Ghazna* deposed the drunken and incompetent governor *Bōri*, and installed *Sebük -Tegin* as their governor and leader.

### **The Ghaznavids**

The history of the *Buyids* in western and central Persia is to a large extent interwoven with that of the *samanids* and *Ghaznavids* in eastern Persia. Of the *Ghaznavid* sources, the earliest is the eulogy of the exploits of *Sebuktigin* and *Mahmud*, *Ta'rikh al-Yamini*, which the official *Abu Nasr Muhammad b. Abd al-Jabbar al-Utbi* (d. 427/1036 or 431/1039-40) wrote in an exaggerated style of Arabic. As a historical text, its vagueness about dates and places reduces its value and the author was more interested in the western parts of the Ghaznavid Empire than in India, but the *Yamini* is not wholly full of servile flattery and we learn a certain amount about the condition of the masses outside the court circle and army. The *Zain al-akhbar* of *Gardizi*, a general history of Persia from legendary times onwards, was written in Persian and dedicated to Sultan *Abd arrashid*. The third and most important source here is the *Ta'rikh-e Mas'udi* of *Abu'l-Fadl Baihaqi* (385-470/995-1077), which gives us a unique insight, almost a day-to-day account, of the working of the Persian bureaucracy which ran the Ghaznavid Empire. He aimed to produce a history of the whole Ghaznavid dynasty down to the accession in 451/1059 of *Ibrahim b. Mas'ud*, but at least 25 volumes of the *Mujalladat* have been lost, and we now possess only the part dealing with *Mas'ud's* reign, and even that is not entirely complete. *Baihaqi's* approach reveals his superiority as a historian to the turgidity of *'Utbi* and the jejuneness of *Gardizi*; his mind was balanced and judicious, he was able critically to weigh up conflicting evidence, and his narrative is fresh because he was a personal witness of many of the events he describes.

The Samanids ruled directly over Transoxania, comprising the valleys of the middle Oxus, the *Zarafshan* and the middle *Syr Darya*, with *Khurasan* in close dependence. However, *Khurasan* tended latterly to fall under the control of powerful military leaders. Some of these were of Turkish slave origin, like *Tash*, *Begtuzun* and the eunuch *Fa'iq*. Others came from local landowning families, like *Abu Ali Chaghani* and the *Simjuris*. Following the Abbasids, the Samanids aimed to make their court a centre of culture and gracious living, and the Amirs' part in encouraging the renaissance of New Persian literature was considerable. There is a fine description of the splendour of *nasr b. Ahmad's* court in one of *Rudaki's* poems. Yet despite this deference, the Samanids failed to conciliate all the religious classes and draw them to their side. The petty town of *Ghazna* in eastern *Afghanistan*, which became the centre of *Sebuktigin's* power, had been theoretically a Samanid possession, but in practice, control from distant *Bukhara* had been tenuous. Although the geographers of the 10th century describe *Ghazna* as one of the entrepôts of the transit trade connecting *Khurasan* and *Transoxania* with India, its economic role was never as important in this respect as that of *Kabul*. It was really the *Ghaznavid* Sultans who erected *Ghazna*, previously a small town on the margin of the Indian political and cultural world, into the centre of an empire. Before *Sebuktigin* achieved power in *Ghazna* and *Zabulistan*, a series of Turkish slave governors had ruled there on behalf of the Samanids. *Alptigin* had his position in *Ghazna* regularised by a patent of investiture (*manshur*) from the *Amir Mansur b. Nuh*, according to *Juzjani*; but the *Siyasat-nama* mentions an expedition sent against *Alptigin* from *Bukhara* under one *Abu Ja'far*, which was defeated outside the gates of *Ghazna*. On his death in 352/963, he designated his son *Abu Ishaq Ibrahim* as his successor. For the next three years, *Abu Ishaq* held the governorship of *Ghazna*, travelling to *Bukhara*, apologising for his father's errors, and securing investiture from the Amir. On *Abu Ishaq's* death in 355/966, the Turkish troops in *Ghazna* chose one of their commanders, *Bilgetigin* (*Bilkatigin*), a former ghulam of *Alptigin's*, as their leader. After governing *Ghazna* for ten years, *Bilgetigin* died in 364/975, and another of *Alptigin's* ghulams, *Piri* or *Piritigin*, held power for two years. In 366/977 the Turkish soldiery in *Ghazna* deposed *Boritigin*, and *Sebuktigin* took his place, beginning a twenty years' reign. *Sebuktigin* was again one of *Alptigin's* ghulams.

It is noteworthy that the Persian culture which the Sultans acquired eventually led their court genealogists to attach them to the Iranian past, just as the genealogists of the Samanids, *Buyids* and *Ziyarids* had done for their masters, and not to some ancient princely family of the Turks, which would have been more plausible. *Sebuktigin* was captured by a neighbouring tribe, the *Bakhtyan*. *Sebuktigin* was sold to a slave-dealer of *Chach*, who took him with other slaves to a depot at *Nakhshab*. After a period of training in the military and equestrian arts, he was bought at *Nishapur* by the Hajib *Alptigin* for service in his guard. Thereafter, according to *Nizam al-Mulk's* narrative, he climbed rapidly under *Alptigin's* patronage, at a rate much quicker than the normal for Samanid ghulams allowed. During the governorships in *Ghazna* of *Bilgetigin* and *Boritigin*, *Sebuktigin's* prestige grew among the Turkish troops, and on *Boritigin's* deposition he was, as we have seen, chosen by the army as their head. *Sebuktigin* had for some time been winning over other army leaders to his side by giving lavish twice-weekly feasts for them, and now this work of conciliation bore fruit. He also acquired local connections outside the ranks of his Turkish fellow-soldiers; the future Sultan *Mahmud* was born in 362/971 of the daughter of a chief (*ra'is*) of *Zabulistan* whom *Sebuktigin* had married. Like his predecessors in *Ghazna*, *Sebuktigin* continued to regard himself as governor there for the Samanids. The names of the Amirs appear on his coins before his own name, and the title on his tomb at *Ghazna*, *al-Hajib al-Ajall*, shows that he clung to this status till his death. Hence in 383/993 the *Amir Nuh b. Nasr*, faced with *Fa'iq* and *Abu 'Ali Simjuri* united against him in rebellion, summoned the faithful *Sebuktigin* to Transoxania. After his victory in 384/994, *Sebuktigin* had been rewarded with the governorship of *Balkh*, *Tukharistan*, *Bamiyan*, *Ghur* and *Gharchistan* and the *laqab* of *Nasir ad-Din wa'd-Daula*, and *Mahmud* with *Abu 'Ali's* old job as commander of the army in Khurasan and the *laqab* of *Saif ad-Daula*. *Mahmud* had then made *Nishapur* his headquarters. Judging by *Sebuktigin's* last wishes, he did not envisage that his family should set up as an independent dynasty, despite the evident decay of the Samanids. When he died in 387/997, *Abu'l-Qasim Mahmud* was to command the army in Khurasan, for *Sebuktigin* did not claim any right to nominate the governor there; *Abul Muzaffar Nasr* was to remain governor of *Bust*; and *Isma'il* was to have *Ghazna* and *Balkh*. In allotting *Ghazna* to *Isma'il*, *Sebuktigin* may have been influenced by the fact that *Isma'il* was his son by a daughter of *Alptigin's*, and may have felt it more fitting that a descendant of *Alptigin* should rule there; the apparent preference of the weak *Isma'il* over the forceful and experienced *Mahmud* puzzled Muslim historians of the Ghaznavids.

Isma'il was unable to retain the territories he had inherited, and by 388/998 *Mahmud* had made himself ruler of all the lands his father had held. When *Mahmud* deposed his brother, he came from *Ghazna* to *Balkh* and did homage to the Amir, who confirmed him in the provinces of *Ghazna*, *Balkh*, *Bust*, *Herat* and *Tirmidh*. *Mahmud* now restored the *khutba* in Khurasan to the Caliph *al-Qadir* and was rewarded by a grant from Baghdad of a *manshur* for Khurasan and the titles *Wali Amir al-Mu'min'in* and *Yamin ad-Daula wa-Amin al-Milla*. Thus *Mahmud* was now master of Khurasan, with its rich commerce, its fertile agricultural oasis and its populous towns. Undoubtedly, it was the financial richness of the province which appealed to *Mahmud*, with his insatiable demands for money, the sinews of war. During his reign, *Mahmud* felt the need for legal and moral confirmation by the Caliph of the accomplished fact of his empire. The purge of *Isma'ilis* in the Ghaznavid territories was particularly calculated to please the Abbasid Caliphs, who were at this time in many ways overshadowed by the wealth and splendor of their *Fatimid* rivals in Cairo. In Khurasan, therefore, *Mahmud* encouraged the *Karamiyya* sect to persecute the *Isma'ilis*; he ostentatiously had the *Fatimid dai Taharti* executed; and he satisfied the Caliph over his Vizier *Hasanak's* dealing with the *Fatimids*. For the execution of *Taharti*, *Mahmud* received the further titles of *Nizam ad-Din* and *Nasir al-Haqq* from *al-Qadir*, and after the *Somnath* expedition of 417/1026, a deed which fired the imagination of the Islamic world, that of *Kahf ad-Daula wa'l-Islam*. The poetry of the period is full of references to the Sultans' zeal for the Sunna and of eulogies of their harrying of the *Qaramita*, as the *Isma'ilis* are usually called in contemporary Ghaznavid sources; and the epithet '*Ghazi*', although not a formal title of the Sultans at this time, is frequently used by the poets in these connections. *Farrukhi* remarks, in a *marthiya* on the death of *Mahmud*, that the heretics can now sleep peacefully. *Mahmud* was always careful to include the Caliph's name on his coins, to send to *Baghdad* presents from the plunder of his campaigns and to depict himself in his fath-namas as a warrior for the faith. Under *Mas'ud b. Mahmud*, loyalty to the dynasty continued to be identified with religious orthodoxy. The honorific titles *Nasir Din Allah*, *hafiz Ibad Allah*, *al-Muntaqim min A'da' Allah* and *Zahir Khalifat Allah Amir al-Mu'minin* and the investiture patent, which *Masud* received at *Nishapur* in 421/1030 from the Caliph's envoy, were important weapons in the succession struggle with his brother *Muhammad*; he ordered that copies of the *manshur* and details of the *laqabs* should be sent to the cities of *Khurasan* and *Badghis* and publicised there, so that the people might rally to his side.

### **The fall of the *Ghaznavid* and The rise of the *Seljuk* Empire.**

Although *Firdausi* makes the Oxus the traditional boundary between Iran and Turan and states that there was a natural antipathy between the two racial groups, 'Two elements, fire and water, which rage against each other in the depths of the heart', and although the defence of the north-eastern frontier has always been one of Persia's historic roles, there was never in practice a hard-and-fast division between the two racial groups. In the early Islamic period there were, Turkish elements in much of what is now eastern Afghanistan, with *Khalaj* and *Oghuz* nomadising on the plateau between *Kabul*, *Ghazna* and *Bust*. Transoxania and *Khwarizm* were in intimate geographical and economic contact with the Turkish steppes. Turkish slaves first appeared in the Caliphate during the Umayyad period when Arab armies raided through the Caucasus to the Volga mouth and across the Oxus into Central Asia. *Kashghari* list twenty-two tribes of the *Oghuz*, and says that the *Qiniq* are the leading one, the tribe of the princes of the *Oghuz*. The *Seljuq* family-it does not seem originally to have been any bigger social unit than this - belonged to the *Qiniq*. In the whole episode we have an instance of the political disunity and divisiveness of the *Oghuz*. The three sons of *Seljuq*, *Arslan Isra'il*, *Mika'il* and *Musa* (the fourth, *Yunus*, died young) moved towards Transoxania and entered the service first of the Samanids and then of various *Qarakhanid* princes. According to *'Utbi*, the *Oghuz* had a traditional bias in favour of the Samanids. What impelled the *Seljuqs* and their followers to move southwards from *Jand* and seek pastures in the neighbourhood of *Bukhara*? The region was, of course, politically troubled:

Two old-established dynasties, the *Afrighid Khwarizmshahs* and the *Samanids*, had recently collapsed and two new ones, the *Qarakhanids* and *Ghaznavids*, had arisen to fill the vacuum of power. Economic factors may have been involved. Several sources on the history of Central Asia speak of lack of pastures there and overcrowding of its population. It is very probable that pressure from the *Qipchaq* and their associated tribe of the *Qanghli* was a factor in the migrations of the *Oghuz* at this time. In the first three decades of the 11 th century, the *Seljuq* family lived as condottieri on the Islamic frontiers, giving their services to whomever would promise them plunder and pasture land for their followers. There was no unified direction among the whole body of Turkmens, and no coherent policy; sections of them alternated now between the service of the *Qarakhanids* and that of the *Ghaznavids*. They plundered the settled lands of northern Khurasan and their flocks were a menace to agriculture there .

In 418/1027 the people of Nasa and Abiward complained to the Sultan of these depredations and punitive measures were taken. A crushing defeat was inflicted on the Turkmens, who then scattered far and wide, some back into the *Dehistan* steppes and the *Balkhan-Kuh* hills, others westwards into Persia, where some of them found employment with local rulers. It was hoped in this way to cow the remaining Turkmens, but in practice it merely added a further motive, that of vengeance, to their violence. In their letter of 426 to the governor of *Khurasan Suri*, the *Seljuq* leaders *Yabghu*, *Toghril* and *Chaghri* promised that if the Sultan would let them settle at *Nasa* and *Farawa*, they would act as guards against fresh Turkmen incursions from *Balkhan-Kuh*, *Dehistan* and *Khwarizm*, and would inflict punishment on the Iraqi' Turkmens. Some sources explicitly identify him with Musa b. Seljuq. In practice, *Toghril* and *Chaghri* were the directing brains behind the *Seljuq* bands' military adventures. A group within the Turkmen following of *Toghr'il*, *Chaghri* and the *Yabghu* which has recently attracted the attention of *Minorsky* and *Cahen* is that of the *Yinaliyan / Inaliyan*. The three leaders crossed the Oxus in 426 with 10000 riders and with another group of Turkmens from *Khwarizm* who had no mounts and who had to go on foot, and made for *Merv* and *Nasa*. According to *Baihaqi*, the riders comprised both *Seljuqiyan* and *Yinaliyan*. The latter group were led by *Ibrahim Inal*, whom the sources all take to be *Toghril's* uterine half brother. The *Seljuqs* had remained on their pastures near *Bukhara* in the employment of *Alitigin*, who had attached them to himself by promises and by subsidies, and who had used them as military auxiliaries. The *Malik-nama* [in *Ibn al-Athir* and *Mirkhwand*) mentions that discords arose between *Alitigin* and the *Seljuqs* after 420, and these eventually caused the movement of the Turkmens from the *Bukhara* district. Their deference towards the Sultan was wearing thin. Emboldened by their successes, they made fresh demands on him in the autumn of 428. They had found the pastures allotted to them on the desert fringes inadequate and now asked for the grant of *Merv*, *Abiward* and *Sarakhs*. The three leaders met for a colloquy at *Sarakhs*, *Toghril* coming from *Nishapur* and *Yabghu* from *Merv*. *Toghril* and the *Inaliyan* suggested moving on to western Persia and the Byzantine marches as the "Iraqi" Turkmens had done. *Chaghri* conceded the Sultan's superior resources in wealth and manpower, but pointed out their own advantages in superior mobility; hence, he said, they should stay in *Khurasan*. According to *Baihaqi*, whom we would expect to be impartial here, the decision of 431 to stay in *Khurasan* was *Chaghri's*, against the opinions of *Toghril* and *Yabghu*. The sources differ on the topic of the plundering of *Nishapur* when the *Seljuqs* first occupied it in 429.

According to *Baihaqi*, *Toghril* gave special orders to *Chaghri* and *Ibrahim Inal* that they should not oppress the local people. The mobility and lightness of the Turkmen bands was their chief asset. Up till modern times, the nomads of the Eurasian steppes have had advantages over the professional armies of the civilised, settled powers. These last have rarely been able to use in pitched battles their superior fire-power and tactical knowledge. The raiders have snatched up their plunder and retreated into the steppes before an engagement could be made; and pursuit has had little point, for the nomad has no possessions worth capturing. Slaves have been the only assets brought back from punitive campaigns. These considerations were valid for the Turkmen invasions of *Khurasan*. The more mobile and frugal nomads wore down in the end the *Ghaznavid* armies, despite the fact that the latter were led by Turkish professional soldiers. One of *Mas'ud's* courtiers said that 'the steppe is father and mother to them, just as towns are to us'. Clearly, the *Ghaznavid* armies were hampered by their inferior mobility and by their dependence on fixed bases where provisions, fodder and other war material was concentrated. The *Seljuqs* first appeared in *Nishapur* in Sha'ban 429. To understand why the *a'yan* of *Nishapur* and of other *Khurasanian* towns for the most part surrendered peacefully to the Turkmen, we must recall briefly about the economic and commercial interests of the province, the agriculture of its fertile oases, the manufactures of its urban craftsmen and the long-distance trade organised by its merchants and financiers. Its interest lay in stable, firm government. The *Khurasanians* expected to pay taxes, but required in return adequate defence. However, *Mas'ud* found it difficult to reconcile the claims of *Khurasan* with the temptations of expansion in India, and his military prestige was waning as the strength of the Turkmen grew. The loyalty of the people of *Khurasan* inevitably suffered when the Sultan became patently unable to provide protection. The position of the densely-populated towns of the oases thus became parlous. A city like *Nishapur* or *Herat* could not normally feed itself. Instead, other cities like *Merv*, *Herat* and *Balkh* were adequately protected, and the towns on the northern fringes of *Khurasan*, such as *Nasa*, *Abiward* and *Sarakhs*, were well fortified against attack from the steppes. Instead of holding out in the uncertain hope that help from distant *Ghazna* would come, the *a'yan* of *Nishapur*, with the lay elements being particularly prominent, came to terms with the *Seljuqs*.

Already in the previous year of 428 , Sultan *Mas'ud* had been warned that the people of *Khurasan* had become resigned to giving allegiance to the *Seljuqs*, and in their *fath – nama* to the Caliph after *Dandanqan*, the *Seljuqs* claimed that 'the notables and prominent people' of the province had appealed to them for protection. There are references to other towns of *Khurasan* making their own terms with the invaders whilst nominally under *Ghaznavid* rule. As early as 426/1035 the three leaders *Toghril*, *Chaghri* and *Yabghu* called themselves 'Clients of the Commander of the Faithful'. And it is a remarkable indication that the *Seljuqs* were already seeking the cachet of orthodoxy and Caliphal recognition. The occupation in 429 of *Nishapur* was a turning-point, for the *Seljuqs* now found themselves masters of the administrative capital of *Khurasan*. According to *Imad ad-Din*, *Toghril* behaved like a fully independent ruler: He forbade, he gave orders, he made grants, he levied taxes, he administered efficiently, he abolished things, he ordered affairs correctly, he abrogated them and he presided every Sunday and Wednesday over the investigation of *mazalim*. He also began calling himself *as-Sultan al Mu'azzam* and *Rukn ad-Dunya wa'd-Din*. The *Seljuqs* were all unfamiliar with the ways and usages of civilised life. A powerful and well-equipped force of elite soldiers was now assembled in *Ghazna*. The sultan held a splendid farewell feast in the *Firuzi* Garden, and the troops were reviewed on the greensward of the 'Golden Field'. The the main *Ghaznavid* army, but by this time *Mas'ud* was already meditating his move to India. The most momentous decision made by *Mas'ud* in these last months of his reign was that of the move to India in order, as he proclaimed, to spend the coming winter in India. The sultan's ministers, led by the vizier, protested that the situation in *Afghanistan* was not so desperate as to warrant the abandonment of the original *Ghaznavid* heartland. A strong military force could secure *Balkh* and *Tukharistan* against the *Seljuqs*. It was unwise to assume that the Indians had any affection for the dynasty and would provide a safe haven for them. Nor could the *Ghaznavids'* slave soldiers, probably still demoralised and disgruntled after *Dandanqan* and perhaps even fearing for the continuance of the dynasty's power, be trusted with the safe conveyance of the *Ghaznavid* treasuries and possessions to India. But such sound advice was of no avail, and the sultan's self-will, the *istibdad* so often denounced among themselves by his advisers, would not allow him to be swayed by reason. His melancholia included a fatalistic despair that the position in the west could ever be retrieved.

Four days after the failure of the sultan's advisers to dissuade him from his plan, early in *Rabi I* 432 , all the stores of precious metals, ornaments, fine clothes, etc, together with members of the sultan's *haram*, were loaded on camels and the whole assemblage departed for India. *Masud's* force presumably made its way across the mountains from *Ghazna*, probably via *Peshawar*, to the Indus banks. The first section of what must have been a lengthy column crossed the river, with *Mas'ud* in the van, when the remaining part of the army, led by the Turkish eunuch commander *Anushtigin Balkhi* and a group of the palace ghulams, mutinied and plundered the royal treasuries. The rebels then set up *Muhammad* as sultan during the night of 13 *Rabi' II* 432 , although only after *Muhammad* had been threatened and possibly even forced physically to cooperate (according to *Mirkhwand*, he was even threatened with death) . With the sultan's virtual abandonment of *Ghazna* - whatever excuses he might adduce of merely going to India in order to collect troops for a revanche in *Khurasan* - it must have seemed to the soldiers that the once-mighty *Ghaznavid* empire had broken up. That *Muhammad* could never have been more than the puppet of ambitious generals and other self-seekers would certainly have been the case if the reports in certain sources of his blindness were true. Actual power during *Muhammad's* short second sultanate was largely in the hands of his sons, and above all, in those of *Ahmad*, whose behaviour is described in the later sources (though not in *Gardizi* or *Ibn Baba*) as unbalanced (*Husaini* and *Ibn al-Athir*, 'reckless and unbalanced' and even *ma'tuh* 'mad'); of course, these later sources may well have been influenced by the picture subsequently formed of *Mas'ud* as the martyr-sultan. The deposed *Mas'ud* remained at *Giri* for about a month, and then was killed at *Ahmad b. Muhammad's* instigation, either unbeknown to *Muhammad* himself after a forged execution order had been sent to the custodian of the fortress (*Gardizi*) or after *Ahmad* had persuaded his father to agree to the deed (*Husaini* and *Ibn al Athir* , both of whose accounts have many anecdotal touches). Whoever may have been the prime mover in *Mas'ud's* slaying, the fact remained that he was dead and that his son *Maudud* had at his disposal a sizeable military force in northern *Afghanistan*; he was accordingly bound to constitute himself his father's avenger and the punisher of those who had broken the oath of fealty to *Mas'ud* so recently taken. *Mubammad's* forces had established themselves in vicinity of *Peshawar* for the winter, but *Muhammad* was helpless in the face of their indiscipline and of their excesses. *Muhammad's* forces left *Pishawar* on 28 *Rajab* for the battle with *Maudud's* army. The most detailed account of the battle is given by *Gardizi*. *Maudud* won and *Muhammad* defeated.

*Ibn al-Athir* gives the date of *Maudud's* state entry into *Ghazna* as 23 *Sha'ban* 432. *Maudud's* energetic policies and his determination not to accept that the former *Ghaznavid* territories in the west were irretrievably lost gained for him an access of prestige among contemporaries at this time. It must have been difficult for these last to accept that so mighty an edifice as the empire of *Mahmud* and *Mas'ud* could be permanently damaged by a horde of nomadic barbarians from the Central Asian steppes. Even so, *Maudud* still dreamed of regaining the lost territories, and towards the end of his reign he tried to organise a military coalition against the *Seljuqs*, expending large sums of money in subsidies and promising rule over the different regions of *Khurasan*, under a general *Ghaznavid* suzerainty, to various anti-Seljuq powers of eastern Islam to whom he now made approaches. These last included the *Dailami* prince from the *Kakuyid* dynasty of *Jibal*, *Abu Kalijar Garhasp b. Ala' ad-Daula Muhammad*. *Maudud* further made approaches to the *Qarakhanids*, but all these efforts failed. *Maudud* had set out from *Ghazna* with an army, but was immediately taken ill, returned to the capital and died, so that all his grand strategy came to naught. Nor could *Maudud* in the end retain *Sistan* within the *Ghaznavid* sphere of influence, as it had been in the days of *Mahmud* and *Mas'ud*, and by the end of his reign, the ruling family of *Saffarid* amirs had constituted *Sistan* as a largely autonomous unit, although subject now to ultimate *Seljuq* suzerainty. *Majdud* (*Masoud's* son) was thus in India when his father was deposed and murdered. What his attitude was to *Muhammad's* elevation to the throne is unknown, but he refused to recognise the succession of his brother *Maudud* in *Ghazna*. He raised the standard of revolt in both *Multan* and *Lahore*, but was mysteriously found dead three days after the *Id al-Adha*. *Majdud's* revolt thereupon collapsed, and *Maudud* was able to make firm his authority throughout *Ghaznavid* India. In the course of the 4<sup>th</sup> century, the extremist *Shi'i Isma'ili da'wa* or propaganda movement had enjoyed a signal success amongst the Muslims of the old Arab colonies in *Sind* and *Multan*, these regions had recognised the supremacy of the Fatimid caliph in North Africa and Cairo, *al-Mu'izz*. Once *Lahore* was secured for *Maudud*, The *Isma'ili* forces were unable to withstand the powerful *Ghaznavid* professional army, and withdrew to *Mansura* in southern *Sind*. The news of *Mas'ud's* end likewise emboldened various Indian princes into launching an attack on the Muslims. The army returning from *Multan* to *Lahore* was attacked by a coalition of Indian rulers.

Despite his unavoidable concerns with the *Seljuqs* in northern *Khurasan* and with *Sistan*, *Maudud* found some time to fulfil the traditional role of the *Ghaznavid* sultans as hammers of the pagan Hindus and as bringers into circulation within the eastern Islamic economy of the temple treasures of India. After the loss of a rich province like *Khurasan*, warfare in India was now especially vital for financing the administration of the *Ghaznavid* empire and for providing the standing army with plunder and with an outlet for its energies. Having the spoils of India at their disposal; the *Ghaznavids* were great builders of palaces and kiosks and enthusiastic layers-out of gardens and polo-grounds. *Ibn al-Athir* states that *Maudud* died on 20 *Rajab* 441, at the age of twenty-nine. We do not possess much firm information about *Maudud's* two immediate successors. Many of the later sources do not even mention their existence. After the reign of *Maudud's* sons, we come to time of *Abd ar-Rashid's* sultanate. Returning to the evidence of the earlier historical sources on the events surrounding *Ali's* deposition and *Abd ar-Rashid's* assumption of the supreme power, these sources relate that it was the vizier *Abd ar-Razzaq Maimandi* who acted promptly now and prevented the *Ghaznavid* state from sliding into ariarchy. He was en route for *Bust* and *Sistan* when he received the news of *Maudud's* death, and he then determined to set up the most senior surviving member of the dynasty, *Abd ar-Rashid b. Mabmud*, who had been imprisoned by *Maudud* in the nearby fortress of *Mandish* in southern *Ghur*. *Abd ar-Rashid's* sultanate was soon to end in tragedy, and his reign was accordingly too short for us to form any real impression of his character and attainments. Despite the changes of sultans since *Maudud's* death, the bureaucracy continued to operate and to provide an element of stability in the state. It was in *Abd ar-Rashid's* reign that the historian *Abu L-Fadl Baihaqi* became head of the *Diwan-i Risalat* where he had been employed since *Mas'ud's* reign. The outstanding event of *Abd ar-Rashid's* sultanate, was the rise to power of the Turkish slave general *Toghril*, culminating in the violent overthrow and death of *Abd ar-Rashid* and the temporary setting-aside of the *Ghaznavid* dynasty. However, this change proved too cataclysmic a one for the ruling class and the military leaders to stomach, and the old line was restored to the throne in *Ghazna*. *Juzjani*, on the other hand, says that *Toghril* had been one of sultan *Mahmud's* *ghulams*, and that during *Maudud's* reign he had left the *Ghaznavid* service and fought under the *Seljuq* banner for a while, thus gaining a knowledge of their fighting techniques, he then returned to *Ghazna* only in the early part of *Abd ar-Rashid's* reign.

Whether the deed was an isolated act of vengeance or the result of a conspiracy, the result was an end to the extensive injustice and tyranny which the *Tabaqat-i Nasiri* says he had practised. *Khirkhiz* arrived back from India three or five days after *Toghril's* assassination, and after consultation with the great men of state and the military commanders, they agreed to set up a *Ghaznavid* prince on the throne once again. According to *Juzjani* once more, only two princes remained of *Mas'ud's* line, *Ibrahim* and *Farrukh-Zad*, both of whom were immured in the fortress of *Barghund* (the place of *Muhammad b. Mahmud's* imprisonment). The questions of the chronology of *Abd ar-Rashid's* reign, of *Toghril's* usurpation and of *Farrukh-Zad's* accession, are all interconnected. *Abu Shuja' Farrukh-Zad* began a reign which lasted for seven lunar years, three months / seven solar years, three weeks, quite a long one by the standard of what had been recent events in *Ghazna*. *Farrukh-Zad* remains personally a somewhat shadowy figure, although he is praised for his justice and benevolent rule, which did something to infuse an atmosphere of tranquillity into the state after the Chaos and anxiety of the preceding years. The former vizier of *Maudud* and *Abd ar Rashid* , *Abd ar-Razzaq Maimandi*, continued in official service under *Farrukh-Zad*, though not as vizier. On his accession, *Farrukh-Zad* made *Husain b. Mihran* his vizier. Of the sultan's other high officials, we learn that *Abu Sahl Zauzani*, familiar from the pages of *Baihaqi*, acted as head of the Correspondence Department. *Farrukh-Zad's* death came on 17 safar 451, at the age of thirty-four years. At the time of the *Ghaznavid* restoration after *Toghril's* usurpation both *Farrukh-Zad* and *Ibrahim* had been found imprisoned at *Barghund*, and that *Farrukh-Zad* had been brought forth and acclaimed as sultan in *Ghazna*. When *Farrukh-Zad* died, there was a general consensus among the great men of state in *Ghazna* that *Ibrahim* should be raised to the throne, and it appears that *Abu l-Muzaffar Ibrahim* was the last surviving son of political significance, and may well have been the senior member of the *Ghaznavid* royal family. The most pressing tasks facing the new ruler were first, the restoration of social tranquillity and economic prosperity within the *Ghaznavid* dominions, a process already begun by *Farrukh-Zad* , and second, the achieving of a lasting peace with the *Seljuqs*, or at least, a Practical compromise between the two great empires. Concerning the first task, *Juzjani* mentions that *Ibrahim* adopted a vigorous policy aimed at bringing back the empire's prosperity, including the rebuilding of towns devastated in the civil warfare of the preceding decade and the building of new settlements.

Concerning the second task, *Ibrahim* seems to have been a realist and not to have been seduced by irredentist visions of regaining the lost territories of his father and grandfather, as appears clearly from the words imputed to him by *Ibn al-Athir* or his sources. He said: 'If only I had been in my father *Masud's* place, after the death of my grandfather *Mahmud*, then the lynchpin of our dominion would not have fallen out. But now I am impotent to recover what others have taken, and monarchs with extensive realms and numerous armies have conquered our land'. The sources are unclear about the peace negotiations between the *Ghaznavids* and the *Seljuqs*, whether the conclusion of hostilities fell just within the closing days of *Farrukh-Zad's* reign or in the opening ones of *Ibrahim's*. *Husaini*, who is well-informed about *Seljuq* affairs, states that *Farrukh-Zad* made an agreement with *Chaghri Beg*. So far as we know, *Ghaznavid-Seljuq* relations remained peaceful during the last year or so of *Chaghri Beg's* amirate and the reign of *Alp Arslan*, but we hear of warfare during *Malik Shah's* sultanate. Although the *Seljuqs* were supplanters of the *Ghaznavids*, they regarded the elder dynasty with the respect often accorded to old-established houses. In considering *Ibrahim's* Indian campaigns, we have only one relevant passage in the historical sources proper, that of *Ibn al-Athir*, who under the year 472 inserts a general survey of *Ibrahim's* Indian campaigns because, he says, the first one fell within that year. *Lahore* really functioned as a second capital for the *Ghaznavid* empire. The administrative offices for India were situated there, and the town was the concentration-point for the *ghazis* and other enthusiasts for the holy war, who hoped for rich plunder from the *Dar al Kufr*. The sultans had to exercise particular care in appointing trusted officials and commanders to *Lahore*, for once installed there, with hordes of troops at their disposal and rich financial resources behind them, governors had many temptations to rebel. When the *Seljuqs* took over *Khurasan* and western *Afghanistan*, *Ghur* was then in the buffer-zone between the two empires and accordingly of some strategic importance. Amongst all the *Ghaznavid* sultans, *Ibrahim* left a reputation amongst posterity as a wise and beneficent ruler, solicitous for the welfare of his subjects, pious and god-fearing. In his great collection of anecdotes, the *Jawami' al-Hikayat*, *Aufi* mentions sultan *Ibrahim* as himself the author of a manual on statecraft, the *Dastur al-wuzara*. Relations with the *Abbasid* caliphate in Baghdad must have been kept up by the later *Ghaznavids*, though we have no information about specific embassies during *Ibrahim's* reign.

*Mahmud* and Mas'ud had in the first part of the century been especially eager to maintain close relations with the *Abbasids*, projecting their image of defenders of Sunni orthodoxy against extremist Shi'ism and other heresies, and announcing their declared intention of rescuing the caliphs from the yoke in Iraq of the Shi'i Buyids. In the event, it was the *Seljuqs* who delivered the caliphs from the *Dailamis*, whilst themselves substituting a tutelage over the Abbasids which was little lighter than that of the Buyids. We know, the sultans continued to regard legitimation by the caliphs of their succession to the throne as important from the points of view of constitutional propriety and of the buttressing of their royal position in the eyes of their subjects.